References of "Hofmann, Frank 50001999"
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See detailE=K and nonepistemic percpetion
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Logos and Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology (2018), IX(3), 307-31

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See detailHow to know one's experiences transparently
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Philosophical Studies (2018)

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See detailCould robots be phenomenally conscious?
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2017)

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See detailTatsachen, Fakten und Sachverhalte
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Schrenk, Markus (Ed.) Handbuch Metaphysik (2017)

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See detailThe Role of Consciousness For Epistemic Agency
Hofmann, Frank UL

Presentation (2015, December 04)

In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran ... [more ▼]

In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran, and others. At the same time, his conception of rational capacities as powers at the personal level saves our epistemic agency against worries that Hilary Kornblith has put forward. [less ▲]

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See detailVirtue and knowledge
Hofmann, Frank UL

Presentation (2015, November 11)

The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities ... [more ▼]

The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities, the norm of excellence (or 'virtue') applies to doxastic action as well as any other rational action. An argument is presented to the effect that the knowledge norm is the right norm of belief. [less ▲]

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See detailIntentionalism and disjunctivism about perception
Hofmann, Frank UL

Presentation (2015, September 16)

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See detailNon-conceptual knowledge
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Philosophical Issues (2014)

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See detailPerceptual justification and non-conceptual perception
Hofmann, Frank UL

Presentation (2014, September 26)

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See detailThe structuring causes of behavior: Has Dretske saved mental causation?
Hofmann, Frank UL; Schulte, Peter

in Acta Analytica (2014), 29(3), 267-284

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See detailGettier for Justification
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Episteme (2014), 11(3), 305-318

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See detailSeeing oneself through the eyes of others
Hofmann, Frank UL; Pöhlmann, Ferdinand

in Philosophia Naturalis (2013), 50

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See detailWas ist Analytische Philosophie?
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Protosociology: An International Journal and Interdisciplinary Project (2013)

Die metaphilosophische Frage, die ich hier beantworten möchte, lautet: Was ist Analytische Philosophie? Die Antwort lässt sich meines Erachtens in drei Schritten entwickeln. Zuerst kann man ... [more ▼]

Die metaphilosophische Frage, die ich hier beantworten möchte, lautet: Was ist Analytische Philosophie? Die Antwort lässt sich meines Erachtens in drei Schritten entwickeln. Zuerst kann man charakterisieren, was Philosophie ist. Dann kann man bestimmen, wodurch sich Analytische Philosophie auszeichnet. Und schließlich kann man sagen, was eine historisch gewachsene Form von Analytischer Philosophie ist. Der Begriff von Analytischer Philosophie, der sich aus den ersten beiden Schritten ergibt, ist ein systematischer, nichthistorischer. Der dritte Schritt führt dann auf die jeweiligen historischen Formen oder Gestalten von Analytischer Philosophie. Vorausschicken möchte ich, dass Ansgar Beckermann in seinen Arbeiten „Muss die Philosophie noch analytischer werden?“ (2007), „Analytische Philosophie“ (2008) und „Einleitung“ (2004/2012) die Dinge schon weitgehend ins richtige Licht gerückt hat. Nur an einigen Stellen scheint mir noch Klärungsbedarf zu bestehen. Das eine oder andere lässt sich noch etwas zugespitzter und deutlicher sagen. Dies will ich im Folgenden versuchen. [less ▲]

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See detailIn defense of strong virtue epistemology: how to explain success by ability
Hofmann, Frank UL

Presentation (2013, September 30)

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See detailBildung als Selbstbestimmung
Hofmann, Frank UL

Article for general public (2013)

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See detailHow Gettier helps to understand justification
Hofmann, Frank UL

Scientific Conference (2013)

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See detailEpistemic virtues and values
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Henning, Tim; Schweikard, David (Eds.) Knowledge, Virtue, and Action (2013)

Plato’s Meno problem is the problem of why knowledge is better than true belief which is not knowledge. The paper studies the account of this surplus value of knowledge that recent reliabilist virtue ... [more ▼]

Plato’s Meno problem is the problem of why knowledge is better than true belief which is not knowledge. The paper studies the account of this surplus value of knowledge that recent reliabilist virtue epistemologists like John Greco and Ernest Sosa have proposed: knowledge is true belief from epistemic virtue. I reconstruct the master argument which subsumes the epistemic case under the general case of success from virtue. Five accounts of (epistemic) virtue are presented and discussed critically. The result is that only the fifth account – the refined dispositionalist account of virtue, based on an idea of J.J. Thomson – is viable, for the purposes of accounting for the surplus value of knowledge along the lines of the master argument. However, there is at least one remaining question, namely, of why success from virtue has surplus value in general. [less ▲]

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See detailThree kinds of reliabilism
Hofmann, Frank UL

in Philosophical Explorations (2013), 16(1), 59-80

I distinguish between three kinds of reliabilism for epistemic justification, namely, pure reliabilism, evidential reliabilism, and reasons reliabilism, and I argue for reasons reliabilism. Pure ... [more ▼]

I distinguish between three kinds of reliabilism for epistemic justification, namely, pure reliabilism, evidential reliabilism, and reasons reliabilism, and I argue for reasons reliabilism. Pure reliabilism and evidential reliabilism are plagued, most importantly, by the generality problem, and they cannot deal adequately with defeater phenomena. One can avoid these problems only by jettisoning the idea of process reliability. The truth connection – which is essential for any kind of reliabilism – has to be provided in an altogether different way, namely, by means of facts in the world which serve as objective reasons (or evidence). So, as reasons reliabilism says, a justified belief has to be anchored in an objective reason which speaks in favor of its truth. Only in this way can intuitions about defeaters be preserved and explained. And reasons reliabilism can avoid the generality problem. [less ▲]

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See detailThe epistemic role of experience
Hofmann, Frank UL

Presentation (2012, June 12)

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See detailThe generality constraint - vertical, not horizontal
Hofmann, Frank UL

Presentation (2012, May 06)

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