References of "Han, Yutao"
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See detailDoes tax competition increase disparity among jurisdictions?
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

in Review of International Economics (2018)

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See detailON THE DESIRABILITY OF TAX COORDINATION WHEN COUNTRIES COMPETE IN TAXES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

in Economic Inquiry (2017)

The paper contains two distinct messages. First, when jurisdictions compete in two independent strategic variables, the decision to coordinate on one variable (a tax rate) induces a carry-over effect on ... [more ▼]

The paper contains two distinct messages. First, when jurisdictions compete in two independent strategic variables, the decision to coordinate on one variable (a tax rate) induces a carry-over effect on the unconstrained instrument (infrastructure expenditures). Consequently, classical results of the tax coordination literature may be qualified. A second message is that the relative flexibility of the strategic instruments, which may depend on the time horizon of the decision-making, does matter. In particular, tax coordination is more likely to be detrimental (in terms of revenue and/or welfare) when countries can compete simultaneously in taxes and infrastructure, rather than sequentially. The reason is that simultaneity eliminates strategic effects between tax and non-tax instruments. [less ▲]

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See detailDoes tax competition increase disparity among jurisdictions?
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

E-print/Working paper (2015)

This paper investigates whether a less-developed economy can catch up with a more developed one when they compete for foreign direct investments. The main message of the paper is that jurisdictional ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates whether a less-developed economy can catch up with a more developed one when they compete for foreign direct investments. The main message of the paper is that jurisdictional competition can enable the lagging country to catch up if capital mobility is sufficiently high and the productivity gap is not too large. Further, we show that size asymmetry reinforces (weakens) the productivity catch-up resulting from interjurisdictional competition when the lagging economy is small (large). Finally, we demonstrate that the development gap widens when capital becomes less mobile, which is at odds with previous findings. [less ▲]

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See detailAsymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL et al

in Journal of Public Economics (2014)

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision-making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public services and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 275 (24 UL)