References of "Gren, Jakub 50001891"
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See detailHow did the ECB become a fully-fledged central bank of the eurozone?
Gren, Jakub UL

E-print/Working paper (2017)

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See detailThe Politics of Delegation in European Banking Union: Building the ECB's supervisory oversight capacity
Gren, Jakub UL

in Journal of Contemporary European Research [=JCER] (2017)

The nature and scope of the European Central Banks’s (‘ECB’) oversight mandate over the supervision of smaller and medium banks by national supervisors has been one of the most debated aspects of the ... [more ▼]

The nature and scope of the European Central Banks’s (‘ECB’) oversight mandate over the supervision of smaller and medium banks by national supervisors has been one of the most debated aspects of the newly created European Banking Union. In particular, the issue whether the ECB should influence already established national supervisory practises and standards was not immediately straightforward. This paper applies the Principal-Agent (‘PA’) approach to explore the extent of the ECB supranational agency governing the supervisory oversight policies in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (‘SSM’). Notably, one of the important features of the SSM institutional design is the contractual incompleteness of supranational delegation. The ECB has been granted discretion to fill-in the agency contract concluded with the Member States. A brief analysis of the practical operationalization of the ECB oversight role suggests that the ECB could exploit this contract condition to pursue own policy goals (agency hold-up problem) and situate itself in “bureaucratic drift” vis-à-vis the Member-State principals. However, under slightly relaxed Principal-Agent assumptions which assume proactive role of the agent in reducing information asymmetries vis-à-vis its principal, it is also possible that the ECB managed to influence the Member States’ stance, and, in doing so, exercised effective bureaucratic entrepreneurship. [less ▲]

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See detailThe clash of European concepts regarding central bank independence: The Franco-Germanic (“Latin-Teutonic”) dispute on the ECB’s role during the euro crisis
Gren, Jakub UL

in Milenkovic, Marko (Ed.) European Union and Legal Reform 2013 (2015)

The global financial crisis – which, in the European Union, has further transformed into the EU sovereign debt crisis (the euro crisis) – has shaken the foundations of the Economic and Monetary Union as ... [more ▼]

The global financial crisis – which, in the European Union, has further transformed into the EU sovereign debt crisis (the euro crisis) – has shaken the foundations of the Economic and Monetary Union as established in 1992, particularly regarding the stabilising role of the European Central Bank (ECB). As a result, two blocks of countries emerged: the first consisted of the northern eurozone countries (less affected by the crisis), which advocated for strict ECB independence and the continuation of its limited price stability mandate (“the Teutonic block”); the second included the southern eurozone countries, which suffered great difficulties in acquiring financing for their public debts and called for the ECB to take a more politically active role. This paper argues that such contradictory approaches are inevitable in a heterogeneous entity like the European Union (specifically, the eurozone) and need not necessarily undermine the future of the eurozone as a whole. Indeed, the 50 years of European integration led by the Franco-Germanic engine indicate that such different standpoints are nothing extraordinary. The remaining challenge is to transform them into ‘productive tension’ to keep the European project on the move. [less ▲]

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See detailIntegration through differentiation: uneasy relations of the (banking) single market and banking u...
Gren, Jakub UL

in Studia Diplomatica (2015), LXVII(2), 69-83

This article surveys the uneasy interactions of the (banking) Single Market and the Banking Union in the post-crisis EU. It focuses on the jurisdictional interrelationship between their (formally ... [more ▼]

This article surveys the uneasy interactions of the (banking) Single Market and the Banking Union in the post-crisis EU. It focuses on the jurisdictional interrelationship between their (formally independent) policy-making centers: the EBA’s Board of Supervisors (EBA Board) - for the former, and the SSM Supervisory Board (SSM Board) - for the latter. It demonstrates that the jurisdictional domains between the EBA Board and the SSM Board are not firmly demarcated, but rather partially overlapping. Such a set-up may possibly result in a creation of a two-tier post-crisis EU bank regulatory and supervisory system, which in the end may impede efforts for constructing a harmonized bank regulatory and supervisory framework in the EU. [less ▲]

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See detailSupranational Banking Supervision in Europe: The Construction of a Credible Watchdog
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia UL; Gren, Jakub UL

in Journal of Common Market Studies (2015), 53(s1),

Does the institutional design of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and its first assessment of systemically important bank stability bolster the credibility of supranational banking ... [more ▼]

Does the institutional design of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and its first assessment of systemically important bank stability bolster the credibility of supranational banking supervision in Europe? One crucial measure of credibility with regard to the SSM and NCA supervision of less significant banks — the large majority of euro area headquartered bank not subject to direct ECB supervision — is the assurance of consistent supervision in the euro area. This involves some degree of convergence of NCA supervision in order to prevent national supervisory forebearance of struggling banks. This contribution thus examines whether or not the design of the SSM provides the foundation to build convergence in euro area supervision of less significant banks, despite very different national supervisory practices and institutional frameworks. The Principal-Agent approach is used to assess the credibility of the SSM design in terms of providing the foundation for consistent supervision. This contribution also examines the credibility of the ECB’s direct supervision of significant banks. The management of the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment of signficant banks can be seen as the first step in demonstrating the capacity of the ECB to make difficult decisions with regard to the stability of the euro area’s banks. [less ▲]

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See detailControlling the controllers: the institutional design of Europe’s new Single Supervisory Mechanism
Gren, Jakub UL

E-print/Working paper (2014)

This paper examines the institutional design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and views the relation between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Competent Authorities (NCAs) as a principal ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the institutional design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and views the relation between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Competent Authorities (NCAs) as a principal-agent relation in which the NCAs are carrying out supervision of the less significant banks on behalf of the ECB. From a principal-agent perspective, the institutional design is understood as the art of choosing proper ex ante and ex post mechanisms of control by the ECB over the activities of the NCAs. Therefore, the focus of the paper directed on (1) identifying the proper control mechanisms consisting of the ‘ex-ante’ and the ‘ex-post’ controls, as suggested by the principal-agent model, which the ECB’s may use to ensure that its policy preferences are enforced by the NCAs within the SSM and (2) assess whether they may possibly cover all of the NCAs ‘zone of discretion’ relating to supervision of less significant banks on the ECB’s behalf. The working hypothesis is that the NCAs zone of discretion may not be fully controlled by the ECB. It is argued that existence of such ‘black holes’ constitute challenges for the ECB to ensure its policy preferences are enforced in a full extent by the NCAs. [less ▲]

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See detailZasada rządów prawa w polityce zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej (Rule of law in the European Union’s external policy)
Gren, Jakub UL

in Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (Review of Constitutional Law) (2013), 2013(2), 157-175

Rule of law, whose core is „the access to an independent judiciary and judicial review”, fulfills in EU external policy two functions. Firstly, according to the art. 21 of TEU, all EU external actions ... [more ▼]

Rule of law, whose core is „the access to an independent judiciary and judicial review”, fulfills in EU external policy two functions. Firstly, according to the art. 21 of TEU, all EU external actions have to be subdued to the rule of law. Secondly, promoting and consolidating the rule of law is one the objectives of EU external action. In most constitutional systems, a wide margin of appreciation is left as regards to foreign policy and judicial review is considerably limited. In case of EU, the Court’s jurisdiction over EU external policy is differentiated and reflects the old pillar structure. The question which arises here is whether it can be accommodated with the disposition of the art. 2 of TEU, which states that the European Union which is a single legal entity „is founded on the value of rule of law”, and with the principle of EU external policy coherence. [less ▲]

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See detailThe impact of the global financial crisis on central banks independence and mandate : cases of the US Fed, the ECB and the BoE
Gren, Jakub UL

Bachelor/master dissertation (2013)

The recent global financial crisis has shaken the celebrated paradigm of an independent central bank with monetary policy mandate focused on the paramount objective of price stability. During the crisis ... [more ▼]

The recent global financial crisis has shaken the celebrated paradigm of an independent central bank with monetary policy mandate focused on the paramount objective of price stability. During the crisis, central banks, particularly the Fed, the ECB and the BoE; in order to restore financial stability adopted many “non-standard measures” which successfully prevented greater financial turmoil. By providing emergency funding to unstable financial sectors, central banks’ balance sheets have expanded considerably which may pose certain risks to central banks’ independence in the conduct of its traditional monetary policy objectives. Furthermore, seeing the successes of central banks in fighting the crisis, the US, the British and the EU lawmakers decided to enhance their financial stability mandate, which in turn raised many questions as to its “clear and limited” scope and its compatibility with democratic principles. This thesis will explore the post-crisis challenges for central banks, raised by expansion of their balance sheets and broadened scope of their policy objectives, with regard to their independence and mandate. [less ▲]

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