References of "Bäck, Hanna"
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See detailWho gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies
Bäck, Hanna; Debus, Marc; Dumont, Patrick UL

in EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH (2011), 50(4), 441-478

Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the ... [more ▼]

Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of 'who gets what, and why?' in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies. [less ▲]

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See detailDoes European Integration Lead to a 'Presidentialization' of Executive Politics? Ministerial Selection in Swedish Postwar Cabinets
Bäck, Hanna; Dumont, Patrick UL; Meier, Henk Erik et al

in EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS (2009), 10(2), 226-252

In this article, we address recent claims that executive legislative relations in parliamentary democracies are undergoing important changes owing to either a 'presidentialization' or a 'Europeanization ... [more ▼]

In this article, we address recent claims that executive legislative relations in parliamentary democracies are undergoing important changes owing to either a 'presidentialization' or a 'Europeanization' of domestic political systems. Therefore, we test empirically whether parliamentary democracies are indeed experiencing changes in executive-legislative relations and whether these developments can, in part, be explained by an increase in European integration. Using data on ministerial selection in Swedish cabinets during the years 1952-2006, we find that there appears to be a slight tendency towards 'presidentialization', which is indicated by a decrease in ministers with a parliamentary background being appointed, and that there exists some support for the notion that Sweden's political and economic integration into the European Union is part of the explanation for this change. [less ▲]

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See detailMaking the first move. A two-stage analysis of the role of formateurs in parliamentary government formation
Bäck, Hanna; Dumont, Patrick UL

in PUBLIC CHOICE (2008), 135(3-4), 353-373

A standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move-the formateur party-will determine the bargaining outcome. Most ... [more ▼]

A standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move-the formateur party-will determine the bargaining outcome. Most empirical studies of parliamentary coalition formation have paid surprisingly little attention to the formation process. In this paper we model government formation as a two-stage unordered discrete choice problem that better reflects this process. The first step involves the selection of a formateur party, and the second involves the choice of partners by the predicted formateur. We evaluate several hypotheses for the two stages, using a data set of all cabinets formed in the Western European countries from 1970 to 2006. In our analyses of formateur selection, we find that party size is clearly the dominant feature. In the second stage, we show that when predicting government composition it is fruitful to add information drawn from a first stage analysis. [less ▲]

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See detailCombining large-n and small-n strategies: The way forward in coalition research
Bäck, Hanna; Dumont, Patrick UL

in WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS (2007), 30(3), 467-501

Current research on coalition formation is plagued by two serious problems. First, we cannot predict more than about one-third of the Western European governments, and, second, we do not have a good ... [more ▼]

Current research on coalition formation is plagued by two serious problems. First, we cannot predict more than about one-third of the Western European governments, and, second, we do not have a good understanding of the causal mechanisms that explain the effects found in large-n coalition studies. This article illustrates that by combining statistical and case study analyses we can solve these problems. Since statistical analyses are well equipped for measuring and isolating effects, we argue that a coalition study should start with such an analysis. Predictions made in this analysis are then used to select cases. In order to study the mechanisms underlying effects found in large-n coalition studies, we argue for selecting cases that are predicted, and then applying the method of process verification. In order to find new explanatory variables, we argue for selecting cases that are deviant, and then applying the method of process induction. Substantive results of our analysis for coalition theory point to the importance of party strategies based on parties' past experiences, which aim at curtailing present and future costs of competing and governing with other parties. [less ▲]

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See detailWhy so few, and why so late? Green parties and the question of governmental participation
Dumont, Patrick UL; Bäck, Hanna

in EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH (2006), 45

Green parties have been represented in the parliaments of European Union countries since 1981, but it was not until recently that a few have entered national governments. Using a data set comprised of 51 ... [more ▼]

Green parties have been represented in the parliaments of European Union countries since 1981, but it was not until recently that a few have entered national governments. Using a data set comprised of 51 government formation opportunities (where the Greens were represented in parliament), the authors of this article show that the parties involved in these bargaining situations are more office-oriented than earlier studies had found. As Green parties are seen to be less office-seeking than other parties, this general tendency for office-seeking behaviour in government formation may partly account for the scarcity of Greens in government. Furthermore, a number of hypotheses derived from theories that account for the specific nature of Green parties in terms of their office-, policy- and vote-seeking orientations are tested. It is found that Greens participate in government when they have lost votes in at least one election, when the main party of the left identifies them as a clear electoral threat and when the policy distance between the Greens and either the formateur party or the main left party is small (the latter condition must be accompanied by a substantial proportion of seats for the Green party in parliament). As most of these simultaneous conditions only materialized recently, and in a few countries, it is argued that this analysis, which is the first comparative and multivariate test focused on this question, explains the scarcity and the delay of Green governmental participation. [less ▲]

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