References of "Auriol, Emmanuelle 40000020"
     in
Bookmark and Share    
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailA Theory of BOT concession contracts
Auriol, Emmanuelle UL; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2013), 89

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and Örm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and Örm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-o§ between the governmentís shadow costs of Önancing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 243 (125 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailGovernment Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Auriol, Emmanuelle UL; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Economic Journal (2009), 119

The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of ... [more ▼]

The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds "à la" Laffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However the government can contract "ex post" with the private firms. This "ex post" contracting set-up allows more flexibility than regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 61 (9 UL)