References of "Zanaj, Skerdilajda 50003354"
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See detailGreen Consumption and relative preferences in an international ologopoly
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Tarola, Ornella; Ceccantoni, Giulia

E-print/Working paper (2016)

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See detailMigration, wages and income taxes
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in International Tax and Public Finance (2015)

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See detail(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Gabszewicz, Jean

in Canadian Journal of Economics (2015)

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See detailThe Cultural Transmission of Environmental Preferences: Evidence from International Migration
Litina, Anastasia UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Moriconi, Simone

Scientific Conference (2014, July 15)

This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this component, we exploit variation associated with international migration flows. We find that the environmental attitudes of migrants, while being resilient to environmental conditions, also embed a cultural component, which persists till the second generation migrants. Our results suggest that, in the presence of multiple environmental problems that require collective action, comprehending the driving forces behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical to design effective policies. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Cultural Transmission of Environmental Preferences: Evidence from International Migration
Litina, Anastasia UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Moriconi, Simone

Scientific Conference (2014, June 30)

This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this component, we exploit variation associated with international migration flows. We find that the environmental attitudes of migrants, while being resilient to environmental conditions, also embed a cultural component, which persists till the second generation migrants. Our results suggest that, in the presence of multiple environmental problems that require collective action, comprehending the driving forces behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical to design effective policies. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 40 (8 UL)
See detailMigration: a burden or a blessing for the natives
Gabszewicz, Jean; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

E-print/Working paper (2014)

Detailed reference viewed: 39 (6 UL)
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See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Moriconi, Simone; Picard, Pierre M UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2014, January)

This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods ... [more ▼]

This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990-2008. [less ▲]

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See detailOffshore financial centres and bank secrecy
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Thisse, Jacques

E-print/Working paper (2014)

Detailed reference viewed: 67 (6 UL)
See detailThe cultural transmission of Environmental preferences: Evidence from International Migration
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Litina, Anastasia UL; Moriconi, Simone

E-print/Working paper (2014)

Detailed reference viewed: 23 (6 UL)
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See detailAsymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL et al

in Journal of Public Economics (2014)

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision-making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public services and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 277 (24 UL)
See detailCarbon tax, pollution and firms' location
Exbrayat, Nelly; Riou, Stéphane; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, October)

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See detailMergers in Fiscal Federalism
Breuillé, Marie-Laure; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Journal of Public Economics (2013), 105

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See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, July)

Detailed reference viewed: 38 (8 UL)
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See detailMarket Games in Successive Oligopolies
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Gabszewicz, Jean; Laussel, Didier et al

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2013), 15(3), 397-410

Detailed reference viewed: 200 (122 UL)
See detail(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Gabszewicz, Jean

Presentation (2013, May)

Detailed reference viewed: 52 (2 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, March)

Detailed reference viewed: 29 (4 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, February 28)

Detailed reference viewed: 24 (1 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, February 14)

Detailed reference viewed: 17 (1 UL)
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See detailFrom tax evasion to tax planning
Bourgain, Arnaud UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

E-print/Working paper (2013)

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax planning. Two alternative regimes are considered. A first, in which there is strict bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. Moreover, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may reduce or increase the onshore country's tax revenue. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 272 (109 UL)