Reviews


From the late 1960s until the early 21st century – after a brief era of peace following independence in 1954 – generations of Cambodians were born and raised in a state of war, civil war and political violence. Until the end of the Cold War, the international scientific community mirrored the ideological chasm and offered mainly biased accounts and explanations that were used in the “battle for the hearts and minds” of the global public. Since the early 1990s, Cambodia has been less exposed geopolitically, which has led to academic disinterest in many areas, especially – rather surprisingly – in civil war research.

Daniel Bultmann’s book, which is based on his dissertation at the Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany), is the first sociological study of the Cambodian civil war – focusing on one side of the opposing coalitions. After the fall of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime in 1979/80, the new government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–91) was installed in Phnom Penh under the aegis of the invading Vietnamese. On the international stage this regime was supported by the Soviet Union. The opposition was an extremely heterogeneous anti-Communist, anti-Vietnamese coalition forged under the auspices of “the West” with the approval of China, the protector of Pol Pot and Prince Sihanouk. This coalition had its power base in refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. These “insurgents” against the new Socialist republic constitute Bultmann’s research interest. The label “insurgents”, although strictly speaking there was no “insurgency” as such, may reflect the publishing context: the Ashgate Series on Military Strategy and Operational Art, which “highlights the complexity and challenges associated with insurgency and counter-insurgency operations” (see series editorial). Indeed, “complexity” is the right characterization of the Cambodian civil war setting.

The structure of the book is as classic as the writing is lucid and the line of argument stringent. After an overview and critical assessment of the current debate on the theory of civil war, the author presents his theoretical approach, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus-field theory and Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis of power relations, respectively. For this reason, Bultmann defines
different habitus groups within the military field according to the chain of command: “leadership, operators, rank-and-file” (p. 36). To take one of these groups as an example, the habitus types at the top of the hierarchy (“leadership”) are again subdivided into “guerrilla strongmen, intellectual commanders, old military elite, warrior princes and anti-intellectual intellectuals” (p. 37ff.). The latter represent the Khmer Rouge guerrillas after the fall of the Pol Pot regime in Phnom Penh (officially Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–79). Thus, Bultmann uses a sociological matrix to make the complexity of Cambodia’s civil war situation comprehensible. To complete the analytical tableau, on the one hand all habitus groups are correlated with their particular schemata of reasoning and acting and the perception of their specific social field (i.e. the cultural and economic resources). On the other, each habitus group is presented as an ideal type with specific power and discourse practices. This approach provides fresh insights in two areas: new empirical data and theory construction.

The empirical base for the analysis comprises 86 semi-structured interviews with participants of the civil war from all ranks. This compilation alone is impressive and makes the book worth studying. Unfortunately, there are two omissions in the above-mentioned matrix. First, the description of the “warrior princes” – according to the author’s own categorization – is missing to protect the anonymity of the two persons in that group. The protection of their privacy has to be accepted; however, Bultmann could have offered to the reader a more general description of this habitus group. Second, no interviewees for the group of long-standing Khmer Rouge commanders could be found, which is a more serious gap. It should be pointed out that many of them are dead, in prison or refused to comment. Nevertheless, the ability of the author to differentiate the groups by giving them an “individual” profile makes for a fascinating and multi-layered overall picture. The use of habitus hermeneutics and the descriptive strengths of the monograph. Another is the critical assessment and further development of the theory applied.

The original theoretical approach was considered inadequate and too static for two reasons. First, the lives of the actors, that is, their biographies within multiple structural, social and cultural contexts, play a pivotal role. Second, the persistency of patrimonial structures and personal charisma has to be taken into account, otherwise the classification of the matrix will not be conclusive. Even readers without an in-depth knowledge of Bourdieu and Foucault are able to follow Bultmann’s theoretical amendments to the initial design (see the chapter “Sociology, Civil Wars, and Conflict”, p. 165ff.).

Theories of life courses, prosopographical analyses and collective biographies are well known tools for historical studies. Is this volume an example of the (re)discovery of these methods in sociology? The book could mark a fresh and convincing start of this.
The self-restriction to “only” one side of the civil war – that of the “insurgency” – may be criticized. Even if this limitation is legitimate, the author missed the chance to compare the politico-military fate of Khmer Rouge defectors to the Vietnamese with those who returned to guerrilla warfare. However, the only real shortcoming is the exclusion of the refugee camps and their significance for the socio-political and economic situation as a breeding ground for “insurgents”. This omission does not detract from the merits of Bultmann’s work, and his monograph can be recommended to all who are interested in the recent past of Cambodia, especially the civil war, in civil war research and in the sociology of (civil) wars in general and Bourdieu’s theoretical work in particular. Military sociologists or historians are presented with a convincing case study exemplifying how biographies, power relations and discourses may influence war strategies, command-and-control, and even combat tactics. Indeed, the pen is mightier than the sword.

Thomas Kolnberger


Hamengku Buwono IX (1912–1988), known before his accession as Gusti Raden Mas Dorojatun, was Sultan of Yogyakarta from 1939 until his death nearly half a century later. The Yogyakarta kingdom (1,223 square miles) was not even half the size of Brunei, yet its population was considerably larger, rising from 1.2 million inhabitants in 1912 to 1.85 million thirty years later (compared to growth from only 22,000 to 40,000 in the Bornean sultanate over the same period). Yogyakarta city alone increased from around 100,000 to 435,000 over the lifetime of Hamengku Buwono IX (henceforth HBIX).

HBIX played a prominent role in the Indonesian Revolution of 1945–9, joined the national cabinet in 1946, and served as Coordinator of Internal Security and/or Minister of Defence for much of the period from 1948 until January 1953. In the (comparative) wilderness for the next 13 years, he returned to government as the coordinating minister responsible for economic affairs from 1966 until 1972. He was Vice-President of Indonesia, a largely ceremonial role, from 1973 until his retirement from national politics in 1977. Throughout his career he evinced a Talleyrandesque capacity to survive régime change and to back the winning side; he was “always at the centre of events yet managed somehow to leave the impression that he was not connected with them” (pp. 2, 231; AJP Taylor’s verdict on Lord Halifax, regarded as applicable to HBIX as well).

A Leyden intellectual, fluent in Dutch, and a doctoral student (the outbreak of the war prevented him from completing his thesis), HBIX was a competent, albeit dull public speaker. Possessed of a charming smile, he looked diminutive