

The endless baby-boomer generation: Cohort differences in participation in political discussions in nine European countries in the period 1976-2008

Louis Chauvel louis.chauvel@uni.lu University of Luxembourg

Fransje Smits

1. INTRODUCTION

Political involvement and participation are crucial aspects of social capital development, of civil society and social stability (Putman 1995). In a generational change perspective, we observe in Europe a large gap between ‘optimistic’ arguments that focus on the intense educational development of younger birth cohorts and ‘pessimistic’ ones that follow Putnam’s ideas of declining participation in civil society and worries about a lack of political involvement and knowledge (Hooghe 2004; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2013; Putnam 2000; Fieldhouse et al. 2007). The young seem to become less involved in politics (Li and Marsh 2008; O’Toole et al. 2003), at least after controlling for education. The first baby-boomers were and remain more active than the “X-generation” and the following ones. Ken Roberts (2012) anticipates the consequences of the ‘end of the long baby-boomer generation’. This means notably the emergence of a new generation less politically involved. This ‘end’ can be seen as paradoxical since the firsts baby-boomers, who are almost at age 70 today, are endlessly very active politically, and continue to have a central role in this domain. In this respect there is no “end” of the baby-boomers’ specificity, even if their followers experience the end of a cohort trend of increasing political activism. In France, notably, there has long been observed a decrease in the involvement of the young generations in politics, but the debate focused more on a possible age effect of youth delay in a process of early socialization to politics followed by a catch up effect later in life (Muxel 1991).¹ The implicit idea of such models is that this withdrawal from politics is temporary and followed by further re-investment and commitment in politics. Conversely, other scholars stress on the persistence of characteristics acquired during socialization over the life course (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Dassonneville et al. 2012; Glenn 1980; Jennings and Markus 1984;

¹ The authors mention a ‘moratoire politique’, a moratorium in politics that derives from Erik Erikson’s (1950, 1955) development stage theory of psychosocial moratorium of the young.

Neundorf et al. 2012; Prior 2010; Sears 1981). After a period of initial socialization and of transition in politics, temporary experiences transform in permanent traits (Bréchon 2011).

Several previous studies already examined changes in political involvement (Blais et al. 2004; Inglehart 1990; Neundorf et al. 2012; Prior 2010; Van den Broek 1996; Van Deth 1990; Van Deth 1991; Van Deth and Elff 2000; Van Deth and Elff 2004). These studies however could not systematize cohort dynamics. Studying change, one can focus on change over the life course (age effects), change over generations (cohort effects) and change over time (period effects) (Firebaugh 1997; Glenn 2005). Period effects happen to all people, regardless of their age and year of birth. A factor that might cause period effects in political participation for example are elections. By age effects one has to think for example of a declining health over time. Cohort effects generally arise during socialization. People seem to be more sensitive to the contextual conditions during the first phase of their lives (Becker 2000).

Our aim here is twofold. At first, important cohort fluctuations in participation in political discussions exist but have not been sufficiently underlined as an important source of change. We make use of recent improvements of the APC methodology to have a better assessment of these cohort-based changes. Thereafter, we search for appropriate explanations for these cohort fluctuations with contextual elements of cohort specific socialization and life conditions.

Our first aim thus is to analyse differences between cohorts. Differences between cohorts are important elements for the understanding of social change (Ryder 1965). As said, many characteristics are established in the first phase of adult life in the context of transition from adolescence to adulthood and thereafter people are much more stable (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Becker 2000; Dassonneville et al. 2012; Glenn 1980; Jennings and Markus 1984; Neundorf et al. 2012; Prior 2010; Roberts 2012; Sears 1981). Technically this means that differences between cohorts arise by the interaction of period and age effects (Crockett and Voas 2006; Glenn 1980). As a consequence, societal changes occur with the apparition of new cohorts sharing new social characteristics and with the further replacement of older by more recent cohorts (Firebaugh 1992; Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990; Mannheim 1952

[1928]; Ryder 1965). Especially political attitudes are known to be very cohort dependent. Dependent on the socialization context, generations develop differential packages of ideas.

Our study is focused on participation in political discussions in Europe. Other scholars have analysed the cohort dynamics of electoral turnout (Wass 2007), electoral volatility (Dassonneville 2012), political interest (Hadjar and Schlapbach 2009), and political leadership (Chauvel 2010), party membership and extra-institutional participation (petition, demonstrations, etc.) in politics (Grasso 2014). Van Deth and Elff found specific cohort patterns for likelihood to frequently discuss politics and likelihood to never discuss politics: participation seems to generally increase over the cohorts (controlled for education and gender and with period on the higher level) but they did not focus on nonlinear cohort fluctuations. As said, our first contribution here is to re-examine findings with respect to differences between cohorts in participation in political discussions with control of age and period effects as they are taken into account by recent age-period-cohort models (Yang and Land 2013). We hereto make use of a new model able to detect cohort nonlinearities pertaining specifically to the cohort variable and that cannot be explained by the simple combination of age and period. This linear/nonlinear question is central in the tradition of cohort analysis (Mason and Wolfinger 2001): “cohort effects” (as well as the age and the period ones) have two dimensions, a linear one and a non-linear one. The linear dimension expresses for instance the increasing level of living that younger cohorts enjoy, when progressive long term economic growth happens; the non-linear one expresses, when it exists, that some cohorts are specifically above or below the general cohort trend. In France for instance, the cohort born in 1950, is particularly lucky in terms of income (Chauvel and Schroeder 2014), having at the same age a systematic +10% in their income compared to cohorts born 15 years before or after. The contemporary literature on age-period-cohort shows that it is impossible to identify long term trends so that they are unequivocally attributed to period or cohort. Conversely, the cohort “bumps” (the specific empirical divergence of cohorts to the predicted values resulting from the age and period effects they belong to), when they exist, can be clearly identified. Our main interest thus is not the long term linear change that cannot be identified (Firebaugh 1997; Glenn 1989; Glenn 1994; Mason et al. 1973; Yang and Land 2008; Luo 2013). Indeed on the long range, it is empirically equivalent to say that with period change all the population receive 1% more each year versus with

cohort change each cohort receives 1% more. A linear growth is not cohort or period specific for APC models. On the contrary, with our method, which adds appropriate constraints, the non-linear changes in these three variables are identifiable in a unique and robust manner. This method focuses on cohort fluctuations and non-linear dynamics where some cohorts are drifting away from the linear trend and others face relapses compared to the cohort linear dynamics. In political participation, cohort bumps or fluctuations of that type have been already detected (Putnam 2000; Becker 2000; Grasso 2014) but our aim is to improve their detection with larger samples and explanation in a comparative perspective.

Our second contribution will include firstly a test of *individual* level explanations for cohort effects. For example level of education could be an important factor in the understanding of changing political behaviour over time (Dalton 1984; Hadjar and Schlapbach 2009). Education can be seen as a major resource for political socialization (Dassonneville et al. 2013; Galston 2004; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2011; Torney-Purta 2002) and obviously level of education strongly varies over cohorts (Smith 1993; Wilson et al. 2011). Results of previous studies show positive effects (Blais et al. 2004; Hadjar and Schlapbach 2009; Nie et al. 1996; Putnam 2000). Although these of course are less likely to explain cohort differences, other explanatory variables we take into account are gender and family structure. We know there are important gender differences in political participation (Blais et al. 2004; Hadjar and Schlapbach 2009; Neundorf et al. 2012; Van Deth and Elff 2004). We take into account marital status as well. Neundorf et al. find (2012) that getting married does not directly affect the degree of political interest while others (Blais et al. 2004; Denver 2008; Stoker and Jennings 1995) hypothesize a positive effect of having a partner. A priori, the degree to which these three factors changed over cohorts and the extent to which these factors actually influence political participation could have an impact on the cohort fluctuations. We secondly try to explain change over birth cohorts with two *contextual* factors that express the specific context of cohort socialization. After all, as said, people are especially susceptible to adopt durable traits while being young. The first contextual factor is the economic situation at the moment a cohort entered the labour market. In comparison to other birth cohorts we take into account, the early baby boom generation entered the labour market in a period of affluence. Affluence is not simply an increase in opportunities and a lower risk of

unemployment and poverty, it also develops possibilities of self-expression and need of higher level of fulfilment. This is the general Inglehart (1977) expression of a post-materialist need for political participation. Therefore, we take into account the economic context at age 25. Beyond Inglehart, many authors underline the relation between economic downturns and youth problems pervasively observed (Chauvel and Schröder 2014; Therborn 2014; De Lange *et al.* 2014). The second contextual explanation results from differences between cohorts in relative size. In the Easterlin (1961) tradition, confirmed by Easterlin *et al.* (1993), the larger a birth cohort, the stronger its risk to face scarcity of employment, poverty, and social problems resulting from population overcrowding. This could be true in economics but could be less appropriate in political terms where numbers and social density count: the ‘protest generation’ is as well a large generation, benefitting in social morphologic terms (Durkheim 1964 [1893]) from a larger ‘social volume’ and ‘moral density’ that increase interdependence, opportunities for integration, and ultimately communication. From this perspective it could be expected that the larger a cohort, the stronger its opportunities of collective mobilization and of political discussion of its own interest.

2. DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

We use the *Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File* (Schmitt and Scholz 2005) which contains 78 surveys and which ends in 2002. We added *Eurobarometer* surveys conducted until the end of 2008. Nine countries (presented in the graphs under their International standard organisation ISO code) are selected on the base of their seniority in the survey: France (fr), Belgium (be), Netherlands (nl), West Germany (de), Italy (it), Luxembourg (lu), Denmark (dk), Ireland (ie) and Great Britain (uk). We remove people who are younger than 20 and people who are older than 69 at the moment of interview from the data. After this deletion the number of respondents is between sixty and seventy thousand for all countries except Luxembourg (which has almost 30,000 respondents).

People are asked ‘When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?’. Since it is impossible to say how often ‘frequently’ and ‘occasionally’ exactly are, we decide to contrast the people who answered ‘never’ to the others.²

We measure education by age at which people left school. We construct the following three categories and include them as dummies: people who left school before reaching the age of seventeen, people who left school while being seventeen, eighteen or nineteen years old, and people who left school while being at least twenty years old. Since we only include people aged 20+, this third group also includes the ones who are still studying. We also use dummy variables for sex (reference is male), and marital status (single/divorced/separated/widowed=0, married/cohabiting=1).

Economic situation in the period of labour market entrance is measured by the detrended relative value of the logged gross domestic product per capita in real terms (constant purchasing power parity dollars 1995) when the cohort is 25 years old. The source is the Penn world tables version 7.1.

Cohort size is obtained from the World Health Organisation Mortality database that provides the size of the different cohorts of the countries which are the base of the calculations of the populations at risk by age groups. We take into account the detrended relative size of the birth cohort in the resident population.

Figure 1 and 2 are based on all available information for the period 1976-2008. In order to make it possible to compare our APC models with and without controls, we based these models on the same groups of people. This means that in the models without controls we do not take into account people

² Additional analyses in which the frequently discussers are contrasted to the occasionally and never discussers show similar results. We estimated the same models with a continuous dependent variable as well. The best solution would be to make use of an ordinal logistic regression specification, but due to the limitations in the general linear model glm with constraints in Stata we did not have this opportunity.

with missing values on at least one of the controls. This deletion reduces the number of cases by about seven per cent.

3. METHODS

The method we apply here is the APCD (Age Period Cohort - Detrended) model that is designed to disentangle the effects of age, period and cohort.³ This model is a modernization of a former one developed by Holford (1983): both are designed to retrieve nonlinear cohort coefficients. There, the cohort effect reflects the divergence from the linear trend and retains a cohort curvature expressing the specificity of some cohorts compared to others. The aim of the APCD is to detect cohort bumps expressing the additional information brought by birth cohort to the model with only age and period (Chauvel 2013, Chancel 2014, Chauvel and Schröder 2014). It detects and measures the intensity of the deviation from the linear cohort trend. Compared to the former Holford propositions, this one accepts control variables, can handle a large variety of specifications, and provides confidence intervals of estimators, statistical tests and criteria able to help in the cohort diagnosis.

We generalize here a former OLS type APC model (Chauvel and Schröder 2014) in a logit one. For each country, we consider a dependent variable y_i^{apc} that denotes the existence (0/1) of participation in political discussions for individual i of age a , in period p and then belonging to cohort $c = p - a$. Categorical time effect variables pertaining to age effects α_a , period effects π_p , and cohort effects γ_c , are then indexed by age a , period p and cohort c . To provide accurate controls at the individual level, we consider j covariates $x_{i,j}$ (which can be continuous or binary). Including appropriate constraints, the APCD model with the following expression has a unique and identifiable solution:

³ The APCD is available as a Stata ado-file. It can be downloaded by typing ‘`ssc install apcd`’ in Stata.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{logitPr}(y_i^{apc} = 1) = \alpha_a + \pi_p + \gamma_c + \alpha_0 \text{rescale}(a) + \gamma_0 \text{rescale}(c) + \beta_0 + \sum_j \beta_j x_{i,j} + \varepsilon_i \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sum_a \alpha_a = \sum_p \pi_p = \sum_c \gamma_c = 0 \\ \text{slope}_a(\alpha_a) = \text{slope}_p(\pi_p) = \text{slope}_c(\gamma_c) = 0 \\ \text{with } p = c + a \text{ and restricted to } c_{\min} < c < c_{\max} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$$

(APCD)

β_0 is the constant, we consider j control variables $x_{i,j}$ related to β_j coefficients, α_a is the age effect vector indexed by age group a , π_p is the period vector and γ_c is the cohort vector. These vectors exclusively reflect the *non-linear* effect of age, period and cohort, as we assign two sets of constraints: each vector sums up to zero and has a slope of zero. These vectors are null when the age, period or cohort effects are linear.⁴ The terms $\alpha_0 \text{Rescale}(a)$ and $\gamma_0 \text{Rescale}(c)$ absorb the linear trends; Rescale is a transformation that standardizes the coefficients α_0 and γ_0 : it transforms age from the initial code a_{\min} to a_{\max} to the interval -1 to +1. Since the first and last cohorts appear just once in the model (the oldest age group of the first period and the youngest of the last), their coefficients are less stable; we therefore exclude them. This model is thus an expression of the traditional Mason and Smith (1985) APC model, including controls, having a logit specification and following the Holford (1983) idea that cohort is detrended in the sense that constraints impose zero slopes on age, period and cohort α_a , π_p and γ_c coefficients, while linear trends are absorbed by $\alpha_0 \text{Rescale}(a)$ and $\gamma_0 \text{Rescale}(c)$. A comparison of the results between the APCD model without and then with control variables (for instance education, marital status, etc.) delivers a diagnosis on the degree to which cohort effects are the consequence of changes in population characteristics or not (see results on Appendix 1).

The detrended cohort effect coefficients γ_c are zero when cohort effects are absent. In this case, cohorts do not deviate from age and period characteristics; then the APCD model provides no improvement compared to a simple age and period model (AP) with first and last cohorts omitted, which consists of:

⁴ The constraint $\text{Slope}_a(\alpha_a)=0$ means the trend of the age effect is zero and is true only if $\sum_a [(2a - a_{\min} - a_{\max}) \alpha_a] = 0$. This constraint is easily expressed as a linear equation of coefficients.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{logitPr}(y_i^{ap} = 1) = \alpha_a + \pi_p + \alpha_0 \text{rescale}(a) + \pi_0 \text{rescale}(p) + \beta_0 + \sum_j \beta_j x_{i,j} + \varepsilon_i \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sum_a \alpha_a = \sum_p \pi_p = 0 \\ \text{slope}_a(\alpha_a) = \text{slope}_p(\pi_p) = 0 \\ \text{restricted to } c_{min} < c < c_{max} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$$

(AP)

If at least one γ_c coefficient is significantly different from zero however, then a simple AP model is insufficient. In this case, some cohorts are above or below the expected trend resulting from the simple addition of age and period dynamics. Thus to retain appropriate parsimonious models, comparing the Raftery's (1986) BIC of the (AP) and of the (APCD) is a diagnosis on the relevance of nonlinear cohort effects (Appendix 2).

Other APC techniques converge to similar results. In Appendix 3 we present results of more usual models: the Hierarchic APC (HAPC) developed by Yang and Land (2008) and the APC-IE intrinsic estimator model (Yang et al 2008). They converge in the shape, intensity and significance to the similar results and confirm our strategy. This APCD technique has an additional interesting property: since for all the countries we have a slope-zero baseline for cohort dynamics comparison, cohort bumps (the nonlinear component we focus on here) are easily comparable. We propose then a post-APCD analysis: we will run a linear OLS regression with the detrended cohort coefficients (derived from the APCD-model with controls) as dependent variable and the detrended relative size of the birth cohort in the resident population and detrended relative value of the logged GDP (gross domestic product) per capita in real terms (constant purchasing power parity dollars 1995) when the cohort is 25 year old as independent variables. For 12 cohorts in 9 countries we dispose of these three factors from 1950 (for cohort 1925-'29) to 2009 (cohort 1980-'84). We then retain cohorts born from 1925-'29 to 1980-'84.

4. RESULTS

Next to the APC-analyses, more descriptive ways of analysing the cohort effect provide important insights. Since the APCD models are designed to detect nonlinear cohort effects, it is important to first describe the actual trends.

Bivariately, in all countries, we see a positive effect of year of birth until the cohorts born around 1950 and then a decline in participation in political discussion. In some countries the effect of year of birth is stagnant for the people born after 1950, and in other countries we see a negative effect. There thus is a peak in political discussion for those born in the late 1940 or early 1950.

Next we analyse effects of age, period and cohorts visually. To this end, we present a “synthetic cohort” figure and a “cohort diagram”⁵. To smooth the changes, we use 10 year groupings of periods and cohorts. Synthetic cohort figures make it possible to see differences between birth cohorts *given* certain periods. In order to compare people with different years of birth but with similar ages, one should look at different points on the lines. The synthetic cohort figure thus shows the developments in political participation for different birth cohorts over the survey years. Cohort diagrams make it possible to see differences between birth cohorts *given* certain ages. So, what does the age group 20-29 look like in case they are born between 1950 and 1959, what does it look like in case they are born between 1960 and 1969, etc. To follow people belonging to a certain cohort over the years, one has to move the eyes only up and down.

[Figure 1 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

In the synthetic cohort figure, the cohorts born in the 1940s and 1950s are higher in the political participation indicator while older and younger cohorts are less active in political discussions. These

⁵ This “synthetic cohort” tool is a common descriptive method in demography, sociology and epidemiology (Mason and Fienberg 1985; Preston et al. 2001). The horizontal axis represents age and the vertical one a dependent variable (such as intensity of political participation). Curves represent the trajectory of birth cohort groups, so we can observe the differences in aging process. The cohort diagram is an alternative where cohort is on the horizontal axis, and the curves present age groups, so we can compare different cohorts when they have the same age.

changes give some sense to Becker's typology of generations retained by Van den Broek (1996) and then reworked by Van Deth and Elff (2004): the 'pre-war generation' (born before 1930), 'silent generation' (from birth cohort 1931 to 1940), 'protest generation' (born between 1941 to 1955), 'lost generation' (born from 1956 to 1970) and 'pragmatic generation' (born after 1970). These typologies have been precised and systematized by Grasso (2014:66). For our purpose, these typologies are too much detailed since 'pre-war' and 'silent' generations are in a continuous dynamic structure before the top, and the 'lost' and 'pragmatic' arrive after when the slope is negative. In general, we observe nonlinear continuities, such as bumps, more than strong ruptures. In our nine countries, the 'protest generation' reached a top in political participation and the following ones experienced a relapse. This relapse is rather surprising since we know these cohorts are more educated than the previous ones and since education is known to positively influence political participation.

The synthetic cohort graph confirms as well that the level of participation in political discussion of a cohort is relatively stable and the cohort relative rankings are generally stable over time. 'The stable relative position versus other birth cohorts', as Van den Broek (1996) puts it, can be seen. Not the absolute but the relative position on a variable is characteristic of a cohort. The cohort diagram shows the cohort to cohort dynamics where the cohorts born after 1950 are stagnating or even declining in political discussion at a given age. Two other elements appear: in terms of period effects, from the 1980s to the 1990s, all birth cohorts experience an increase in their political involvement. This period effect could result either of the context of the 1980s that was less propitious for political involvement, or of the political revival of the 1990s where the fall of the wall and the opening of a new era of development of Europe could have given more room and matter for political discussions. In the cohort diagram we see an age effect as well: until the age of 50-59, political involvement generally increases. These two graphs confirm that the cohorts of young adults in the 1960s and 1970s have always been specifically active. In a theory of socialisation related to Karl Mannheim (1952 [1928]), these cohorts who benefitted from a specific period of political socialisation such as May 1968 in France, or the context of the sixties in the western world (Mead 1970) benefitted from better opportunities of political socialisation.

Now we turn to our APCD-methods so that we can get to know more about the significances of the cohort effects, so that we can take into account control variables, and so that we can identify the nonlinearities in the three time variables (age, period, and cohort). We first discuss the effects of the control variables and then look to the cohort diagnosis.

In all countries we see the same picture: the highest educated people are most likely to discuss politics and the lowest educated are least likely. In all countries the differences between educational categories are significant at $p < 0.001$. The largest differences between the two extreme educational groups can be seen in Luxembourg followed by Great Britain and the smallest difference can be seen in Denmark followed by West-Germany. In every country the gender gap is in the same direction, with men being more likely to discuss politics than women, with significant gaps at $p < 0.001$. The gender gap is largest in Italy followed by West-Germany and smallest in the Netherlands followed by Great Britain. The case of marital status is more ambiguous. In six of our nine countries (Belgium, Netherlands, West-Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, Great Britain) there appears to be a significant difference between those living with partner (married and cohabiting people) and the others who are less participative. The difference between both groups is largest in West-Germany and smallest in Great Britain. For participation in political discussions, level of education apparently is the most important explanatory variable.

Now we turn to the degree to which people born in different years differ in terms of frequency of political discussion. The figures show the cohort effects with the confidence intervals. As said, the deviation of the cohorts from the linear trends is shown.

[Figure 3 about here]

In all countries we detect similar bumps: the middle birth cohorts pertaining to the early baby boom generation are furthest above the linear trend everywhere. This is in line with what we saw in figures 1 and 2. Anyway, the APCD method is able to provide deeper insights. First, the descriptive method of figure 1 and 2 is acceptable for the European level sample, but the collapse by country give less

obvious results due to smaller samples. Second, The model delivers by-country non-linear trajectories with their confidence intervals so that we can compare the shapes and make the difference between flatter countries such as Denmark or Germany and more bumpy ones such as France or Netherlands. Third, we can include controls for relevant variables (at first education but also demographic characteristics) that could *a priori* explain the fluctuations. The model is able to confirm the intrinsic specificity of birth cohorts in terms of political participation.

The APCD results confirm that in most countries the cohort of 1945 is most politically participative. In Belgium and Germany the cohort of 1950 is most participative and in Italy the cohorts of 1950/1955. In Luxembourg the difference between the most and least participative cohorts is largest. Note that the confidence intervals are also much larger due to the relatively small sample size in this country. The cohort of 1945 is 0.30 above the linear trend and the cohort of 1915 is 0.40 below the linear trend. In France, the difference between the most and least participative cohorts is large as well. Also here the cohorts of 1915 and 1945 are respectively the least and most likely to participate in political discussions. The accompanying coefficients are -0.33 and 0.31. The bumps are relatively small in the Netherlands and especially in Denmark. In Denmark the coefficients of the two extreme cohorts are -0.19 and 0.23.

Although in all countries the middle cohorts are most politically active, the shapes of the lines are not completely similar. In some countries it is really one cohort that stands out (for example in the case of Great Britain) while in other countries there are multiple cohorts that stand out to the same degree (for example in the case of West-Germany). In most countries political participation continuously rises over the cohorts until the most politically active cohort and thereafter continuously declines over the cohorts.

We tested whether there are similarities in shapes in order to build a typology. Clustering tools such as the Ward CAH however are unable to detect specific types of countries. Apparently there are no real types but a continuum of shapes without obvious contrasts between groups of countries.

Controlling for level of education, marital status and gender hardly changes the cohort effects. The shapes of the continuous and dotted lines in figure 3 are very similar. This means that the composition of the different birth cohorts in terms of education, gender ratio or family structure is not the source of the bump of the early baby boom generation. In other words, the cohort nonlinearities in political discussions do not derive from individual characteristics (even in terms of education) but from other sources, such as cohort specific contexts.

Now we turn to the other two explanatory factors.

[Table 1 about here]

We provide a post estimation regression of the cohort APCD coefficients found in the model with control variables. A set of 9 countries times 12 cohorts coefficients (108 cells) regressed on cohort size and on economic situation at age 25 appears to provide a good explanation of the bumps we observe for the early baby boomer cohorts (see Appendix 4 for details).⁶ The two explanatory variables play a significant role in the cohort differences in political participation. The explanation resulting from cohort size seems strongest, but with a sign opposed to the one Easterlin should have anticipated: large cohorts are more politically active. Then large cohorts experiencing better economic situations at the entry in the labour market, as it is the case of the early baby boom generation in many European countries, might benefit from better political socialization. Conversely, relatively smaller cohorts, victims of economic recession, risk a decline in political participation.

5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

⁶ The height of the variance inflation factor (1.19) shows that the model does not suffer from multicollinearity.

This paper described and explained differences between birth cohorts in participation in political discussions in France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain in the period 1980-2006. Using descriptive and new APC methods, we found clear differences between cohorts in political participation. In general people born around 1950, the early baby boom generation, are most likely to discuss politics and the farther away a birth cohort from this peak year, the less politically participative. This picture is very similar in the different European countries of our set. Although the shapes and effect sizes differ a little bit over the nine countries, people born between 1945 and 1955 are everywhere on the top of a wave of stronger participation in political discussions. Apparently, the early baby boom generation is not only special with respect to health and labour market success (Becker 2000; Buchholz et al. 2009; Roberts 2012), they are also special with respect to political participation.

With respect to the individual level variables we make use of, we see that they cannot explain the cohort bumps: higher education is not the explanation of the specificity of the early baby boomers even if in all countries education matters strongly for participation in political discussions. We also find men to be more likely to discuss politics in all countries. Marital status plays a less obvious role. In six of the nine countries there is a significant effect in which the married and cohabiting people participate more. Taking into account these three independent variables does almost not change the shape of the cohort effects.

Explanations for cohort differences that appear to be useful are cohort size and economic situation at the time of entry into adulthood. In comparison to older and younger cohorts, members of the early baby boom generation matured in a period of strong welfare states (Roberts 2012), rapid economic growth and increasing affluence (Van den Broek 1996). They started their professional lives in times of labour market upgrading and in times of full employment and had a low risk of youth unemployment as a consequence. Older and younger cohorts entered the labour market in a context of scarcity or economic slowdown that could come with stronger relative frustration, more competition within the cohort and less opportunities for solidarity and political commitment in universities, businesses and in the civil society sphere. These cohorts are characterized as well by a smaller relative

size, which diminishes their potential political impact. This result converges with the Kahn and Mason (1987) critique of the Easterlin ‘political alienation effect’: cohort crowding is not associated with a decline in political participation, but with an increase. This means that the Easterlin argument could be complex: the cohort crowding impairs the economic context of a large cohort but at the same time this size gives more room for efficient mobilisation. The worst case is the one of small cohorts entering adult life in a period of economic slowdown, which is precisely the case of the cohorts born before 1925 and of those born after 1965.

Further research must invest more this mystery of the clear over-involvement of the early baby boomers in politics, and complete the demographic and economic explanation we propose here. Next to financial security, another important factor for example could be *existential* security. Because they were born just after World War II, baby boomers experienced much more existential security than older cohorts who faced the European crisis and war in childhood and early adulthood. According to the theory of Inglehart (1977), this existential security could make people more politically active. Future research is also encouraged to test whether changing patterns of media consumption can explain cohort differences. Media is important because consumption changed strongly over time (Glenn 1994; Knulst and Kraaykamp 1998; Samuel 1996) and because discussing politics without having some information about it is hardly possible and ultimately, all political information we have comes from media sources. With a R-square of 0.29 there is room for other explanations, but the fact that many European countries affect similar shapes with a convergence of explanation show an interesting example of how social generations can be influenced by the context of their socialization. Fifty years after Ryder’s (1965) seminal paper, cohort analyses continue to offer useful insights. One of these results is the importance of cohort effects where the ‘political moratorium of the young’ is not an age effect that is absorbed with aging but a cohort effect that could affect the participation of the post 1950s birth cohorts forever.

LITERATURE

- Alwin, D. F. and Krosnick, J.A. (1991). Aging, cohorts, and the stability of sociopolitical orientations over the life span. *American Journal of Sociology* 97(1):169-195.
- Becker, H. A. (2000). Discontinuous Change and Generational Contracts. Pp. 114-132 in S. Arber and C. Attias-Donfut (eds), *The Myth of Generational Conflict. The Family and State in Ageing Societies*. London: Routledge.
- Blais, A., Gidengil, E. and Nevitte, N. (2004). Where does turnout decline come from?. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(2):221-236.
- Bréchon P. (2011). L'abstention, de puissants effets de génération, in A. Muxel, *La politique au fil de l'âge*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Buchholz, S., Hofäcker, D., Mills, M., Blossfeld, H.P., Kurz, K. and Hofmeister H. (2009). Life courses in the globalization process: The development of social inequalities in modern societies. *European Sociological Review*, 25(1):53-71.
- Chancel L. (2014). Are Younger Generations Higher Carbon Emitters than their Elders?: Inequalities, Generations and CO2 Emissions in France and in the USA. *Ecological Economics*, 100:195–207.
- Chauvel L. (2010). The Long-Term Destabilization of Youth, Scarring Effects, and the Future of the Welfare Regime in Post-Trente Glorieuses France. *French Politics, Culture & Society*, 28(3):74-96.
- Chauvel, L. (2013). Spécificité et permanence des effets de cohorte: le modèle APC-D appliqué aux inégalités de génération France U.S. *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 54(4):665-707.
- Chauvel, L. and Schröder M., (2014). Generational inequalities and welfare regimes. *Social forces* 92 (4):1259-1283.
- Crockett, A. and Voas, D. (2006). Generations of decline: religious change in 20-th Century Britain. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 45(4):567-584.
- Dalton, R.J. (1984). Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies. *Journal of Politics* 46(2):264–84.
- Dassonneville, R. (2013). Questioning generational replacement. An age, period and cohort analysis of electoral volatility in the Netherlands, 1971–2010. *Electoral Studies* 32(1):37-47

- Dassonneville, R., Hooghe, M. and Vanhoutte, B. (2012). Age, Period and Cohort Effects in the Decline of Party Identification in Germany: An Analysis of a Two Decade Panel Study in Germany (1992–2009). *German Politics*, 21(2):209-227.
- Dassonneville, R., Quintelier, E., Hooghe, M. and Claes, E. (2013). The Relation Between Civic Education and Political Attitudes and Behavior: A Two-Year Panel Study Among Belgian Late Adolescents. *Applied Developmental Science* 16(3):140-150.
- De Lange, M., Gesthuizen, M., Wolbers, M. (2014). Youth Labour Market Integration Across Europe. The Impact of Cyclical, Structural, and Institutional Characteristics. *European Societies* 16(2):194-212.
- Denver, D. (2008). Another reason to support marriage? Turnout and the decline of marriage in Britain. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10(4):666-68.
- Durkheim, E. (1964). *The Division of Labor in Society*, Free Press, New York City (NY). (Orig. pub. 1893).
- Easterlin, R.A. (1961). The American Baby Boom in Historical Perspective. *American Economic Review*, LI(5):869-911.
- Easterlin R.A., Schaeffer, C.M. and Maucunovich, D.J. (1993). Will the baby boomers be less well off than their parents? Income, wealth, and family circumstances over the life cycle in the United States. *Population and Development Review*, 19(3):497-522.
- Erikson, E.H. (1950). *Childhood and society*. New York: Norton.
- Erikson, E.H. (1956). “Ego identity and the psychosocial moratorium”, in Helen L. Witmer and Ruth Kotinsky, *New perspectives for research on juvenile delinquency* a report of a conference on the relevance and interrelations of certain concepts from sociology and psychiatry for delinquency, held May 6 and 7, 1955. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Children's Bureau, Washington (DC).
- Fieldhouse, E., Tranmer, M. and Russell, A. (2007). ‘Something about Young People or Something about Elections? Electoral Participation of Young People in Europe: Evidence from a Multilevel Analysis of the European Social Survey’, *European Journal of Political Research* 46(6):797–822.
- Firebaugh, G. (1992). Where Does Social Change Come From? Estimating the Relative Contributions of Individual Change and Population Turnover. *Population Research and Policy Review* 11:1-2.


- Firebaugh, G. (1997). *Analyzing Repeated Surveys*. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-115. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Galston, W. (2004). Civic education and political participation. *Political Science & Politics*, 37(2):263–266.
- Glenn, N.D. (1980). Values, Attitudes, and Beliefs. Pp. 596-640 in *Constancy and Change in Human Development*, edited by Orville G. Brim, Jr. & Jerome Kagan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Glenn, N.D. (1989). A Caution about Mechanical Solutions to the Identification Problem in Cohort Analysis: Comment on Sasaki and Suzuki. *American Journal of Sociology* 95:754-61.
- Glenn, N.D. (1994). Television Watching, Newspaper Reading, and Cohort Differences in Verbal Ability. *Sociology of Education* 67:216-3.
- Glenn, N. (2005). *Cohort analysis*. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-115. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Grasso, M.T. (2014). Age, Period and Cohort Analysis in a Comparative Context: Political Generations and Political Participation Repertoires in Western Europe. *Electoral Studies*, 33:63–76.
- Hadjar, A. and Schlapbach, F. (2009). Educational Expansion and Interest in Politics in Temporal and Cross-cultural Perspective: A Comparison of West Germany and Switzerland. *European Sociological Review* 25(3): 271-286.
- Holford, T.R. (1983). The Estimation of Age, Period and Cohort Effects for Vital Rates. *Biometrics*, 39: 311-24.
- Hooghe, M. (2004). Political Socialization and the Future of Politics. *Acta Politica* 39:331-341.
- Hooghe, M. and Dassonneville, R. (2011). The effects of civic education on political knowledge. A two year panel survey among Belgian adolescents. *Educational Assessment, Evaluation and Accountability* 23(4):321-339.
- Hooghe, M. and Dassonneville, R. (2013). Voters and Candidates of the Future: The Intention of Electoral Participation among Adolescents in 22 European Countries. *Young: the Nordic Journal of Youth Research* 21(1):1-18.

- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution. Changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jennings, M.K. and Markus G.B. (1984). Partisan Orientations over the Long Haul: Results from the Three-Wave Political Socialization Panel Study. *The American Political Science Review* 78(4):1000-1018.
- Kahn, J.R and Mason, W.M. (1987). Political Alienation, Cohort Size, and the Easterlin Hypothesis. *American Sociological Review*, 52(2):155-169.
- Knulst W. and Kraaykamp, G. (1998). Trends in leisure reading: Forty years of research on reading in the Netherlands. *Poetics* 26:21-41.
- Li, Y. and Marsh, D. (2008). New Forms of political participation. Searching for expert citizens and everyday makers. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38, 247–272.
- Luo, L. (2013). Assessing Validity and Application Scope of the Intrinsic Estimator Approach to the Age-Period-Cohort Problem. *Demography* 50(6):1945-67.
- Mannheim, K. (1952). The problem of generations. In *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, pp. 276–322. New York: Oxford University Press. (Orig. pub. 1928).
- Mason, W.M. and Fienberg, S.E. ed. (1985). *Cohort Analysis in Social Research: Beyond the Identification Problem*. New York: Springer Verlag.
- Mason, W.M. and Smith, H.L. (1985) Age-period-cohort analysis and the study of deaths from pulmonary tuberculosis. In: Mason, W.M. and Fienberg, S.E. ed. (1985). *Cohort Analysis in Social Research: Beyond the Identification Problem*. New York: Springer Verlag. 151–227.
- Mason, K.O., Mason, W.M., Winsborough, H.H. and Poole, W.K. (1973). Some Methodological Issues in the Cohort Analysis of Archival Data. *American Sociological Review* 38:242-58.
- Mason, W.M. and N.H. Wolfinger (2001) Cohort Analysis. In: N.J. Smelser /P.B. Baltes (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*. Oxford: Pergamon, 2189-2194.
- Mead M. (1970), *Culture and Commitment: A Study of the Generation Gap*, Garden City (NY): Natural History Press.

- Muxel, A. (1991). Le moratoire politique des années de jeunesse. In A. Percheron & R. Rémond (eds.), *Age et politique*, Economica, Paris.
- Neundorf, A., Smets, K. and García-Albacete, G.M. (2012). Homemade citizens: The development of political interest during adolescence and young adulthood. *Acta Politica*, 48:92–116.
- Nie N.H., Junn, J. and Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996). *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- O'Toole, T., Lister, M., Marsh, D., Jones, S. and McDonagh, A. (2003). 'Tuning Out or Left Out? Participation and Non-Participation among Young People'. *Contemporary Politics* 9(1): 45–61.
- Pampel, F.C. and Hunter, L.M. (2012). Cohort Change, Diffusion, and Support for Environmental Spending in the United States. *American journal of sociology* 118(2):420-448.
- Preston, S.H., Heuveline, P. and Guillot, M. (2001). *Demography: Measuring and Modeling Population Processes*. Maiden, MA: Blackwell.
- Prior, M. (2010). You've either got it or you don't? The stability of political interest over the life cycle. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(3): 747-766.
- Putnam, R.D. (1995). Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America. *Political Science and Politics*, 28(4):664-683.
- Putnam, R.D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Raftery, A.E. (1986). Choosing models for cross-classifications. *American sociological review* 51:145-146.
- Roberts, K. (2012). The end of the long baby-boomer generation. *Journal of Youth Studies* 15(4): 479-497.
- Ryder, N.B. (1965). The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. *American Sociological Review* 30(5):843–61.
- Samuel, N. (1996). France. In: G. Cushman, A.J. Veal & J. Zuzanek (eds.), *World leisure participation: Free time in the global village*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schmitt, H. and Scholz, E. (2005). *The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970-2002*.
- Smith, T.W. 1993. The relationship of age to education across time. *Social Science Research* 22:300-311.

- Stoker, L. and Jennings, M.K. (1995). Life-cycle transitions and political participation: The case of marriage. *American Political Science Review* 89(2): 421-433.
- Therborn, G. (2014). A Youth Cohort Devastated. *European Societies* 16(2):165-166.
- Torney-Purta, J. (2002). The School's Role in Developing Civic Engagement: A Study of Adolescents in Twenty-Eight Countries. *Applied Developmental Science* 6(4): 203-12.
- Van den Broek, A. (1996). *Politics and Generations: Cohort Replacement and Generation Formation in Political Culture in the Netherlands*. Tilburg University Press.
- Van Deth, J.W. (1990). Interest in politics. In M.K. Jennings, J.W. van Deth et al., *Continuities in political action: A longitudinal study of political orientations in three Western democracies*. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter/Aldine, pp. 275-312.
- Van Deth, J.W. (1991). Politicization and political interest. In K. Reif & R. Inglehart (eds), *Eurobarometer: The dynamics of European public opinion*. London: Macmillan.
- Van Deth, J.W. and Elff, M. (2000). *Political involvement and apathy in Europe, 1973-1998*. Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES Working Paper 33).
- Van Deth, J.W. and Elff, M. (2002). Politicisation, economic development and political interest in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 43:477-508.
- Wass, H. (2007). The effects of age, generation and period on turnout in Finland, 1975-2003. *Electoral Studies* 26(3):648-659.
- Wilson, J.A., Zozula, C. and Gove, W.R. (2011). Age, Period, Cohort and Educational Attainment: The Importance of Considering Gender. *Social Science Research* 40:136-49.
- Yang, Y. and Land, K.C. (2008). Age-period-cohort analysis of repeated cross-section surveys. Fixed or random effects? *Sociological Methods & Research* 36(3):297-326.
- Yang Y. and Land, K.C. (2013), Age-period-cohort analysis. New models, methods, and empirical applications. CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL
- Yang Y., Schulhofer-Wohl, S., Fu, W. and Land, K. (2008). "The Intrinsic Estimator for Age-Period-Cohort Analysis: What It is and How to Use it?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 113:1697-1736.


Figure 1 Birth cohort and political discussions: Synthetic cohorts in all countries



Y-axis: proportion of people that says to occasionally or frequently discuss politics (instead of never); X-axis: periods in decades; lines are birth cohort groups

Source: Eurobarometer 1976-2008, countries included: FR/BE/NL/DE/IT/LU/DK/IE/GB, N=535,883


Figure 2 Birth cohort and political discussions: Cohort diagram in all countries



Y-axis: proportion of people that says to occasionally or frequently discuss politics (instead of never); X-axis: birth cohorts in decades; lines are age groups

Source: Eurobarometer 1976-2008, countries included: FR/BE/NL/DE/IT/LU/DK/IE/GB, N=535,883

Figure 3 Effect of cohort (APCD) on frequency of political discussion (occasionally or frequently instead of never)



Full lines: estimates, dashed lines; Grey lines: confidence intervals
 Above: without controls, below: with controls of level of education, sex, and marital status.
 Source: Eurobarometer 1980-2006

Table 1 Linear OLS regression of cohort effects found in the APCD-model with controls by detrended economic situation at age 25 and relative detrended demographic size of the cohort

| | Coef. | | Robust SE |
|-------------|-------|-----|-----------|
| Cohort size | .581 | *** | .127 |
| GDP | .505 | ** | .188 |
| Constant | .000 | | .014 |

* $p < 0.050$, ** $p < 0.010$, *** $p < 0.001$, $N = 108$

Appendix 1 - Logistic APCD models on frequency of political discussion (occasionally or frequently instead of never) (source: Eurobarometer 1980-2006) without/with controls

APCD without controls

| | fr:b | fr:se | be:b | be:se | nl:b | nl:se | de:b | de:se | it:b | it:se | lu:b | lu:se | dk:b | dk:se | ie:b | ie:se | uk:b | uk:se |
|-------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Cohort 1915 | -0.328 | 0.064 | -0.333 | 0.060 | -0.209 | 0.070 | -0.299 | 0.066 | -0.086 | 0.059 | -0.398 | 0.119 | -0.189 | 0.058 | -0.204 | 0.062 | -0.280 | 0.059 |
| Cohort 1920 | -0.118 | 0.048 | -0.071 | 0.049 | -0.149 | 0.057 | 0.018 | 0.063 | -0.011 | 0.048 | -0.176 | 0.097 | -0.096 | 0.048 | -0.214 | 0.047 | -0.092 | 0.049 |
| Cohort 1925 | -0.021 | 0.040 | -0.063 | 0.040 | -0.136 | 0.049 | -0.223 | 0.048 | -0.021 | 0.038 | -0.025 | 0.075 | -0.055 | 0.045 | -0.118 | 0.041 | -0.061 | 0.042 |
| Cohort 1930 | -0.082 | 0.039 | -0.018 | 0.036 | 0.003 | 0.046 | -0.083 | 0.047 | -0.186 | 0.035 | -0.076 | 0.063 | -0.017 | 0.044 | 0.040 | 0.039 | 0.067 | 0.041 |
| Cohort 1935 | 0.061 | 0.037 | 0.051 | 0.034 | 0.080 | 0.044 | 0.175 | 0.043 | -0.096 | 0.034 | 0.185 | 0.063 | -0.042 | 0.041 | 0.069 | 0.037 | 0.052 | 0.039 |
| Cohort 1940 | 0.196 | 0.037 | 0.206 | 0.033 | 0.177 | 0.041 | 0.179 | 0.041 | -0.023 | 0.034 | 0.229 | 0.111 | 0.144 | 0.043 | 0.212 | 0.041 | 0.172 | 0.035 |
| Cohort 1945 | 0.306 | 0.034 | 0.227 | 0.032 | 0.249 | 0.039 | 0.196 | 0.044 | 0.140 | 0.034 | 0.302 | 0.112 | 0.232 | 0.041 | 0.224 | 0.039 | 0.255 | 0.034 |
| Cohort 1950 | 0.257 | 0.031 | 0.245 | 0.031 | 0.238 | 0.036 | 0.207 | 0.044 | 0.267 | 0.035 | 0.245 | 0.109 | 0.186 | 0.040 | 0.160 | 0.037 | 0.195 | 0.033 |
| Cohort 1955 | 0.194 | 0.029 | 0.180 | 0.029 | 0.221 | 0.036 | 0.174 | 0.043 | 0.270 | 0.033 | 0.164 | 0.096 | 0.175 | 0.039 | 0.207 | 0.034 | 0.090 | 0.031 |
| Cohort 1960 | 0.122 | 0.030 | 0.095 | 0.030 | 0.005 | 0.036 | 0.180 | 0.044 | 0.136 | 0.033 | 0.269 | 0.096 | 0.082 | 0.042 | 0.104 | 0.035 | 0.036 | 0.031 |
| Cohort 1965 | -0.044 | 0.030 | 0.017 | 0.031 | -0.049 | 0.037 | 0.041 | 0.046 | 0.031 | 0.035 | 0.060 | 0.095 | -0.033 | 0.043 | 0.012 | 0.036 | -0.083 | 0.032 |
| Cohort 1970 | -0.127 | 0.033 | -0.140 | 0.035 | -0.099 | 0.043 | -0.074 | 0.047 | -0.009 | 0.037 | -0.244 | 0.108 | -0.024 | 0.048 | -0.053 | 0.039 | -0.124 | 0.034 |
| Cohort 1975 | -0.138 | 0.041 | -0.163 | 0.041 | -0.118 | 0.054 | -0.233 | 0.059 | -0.163 | 0.044 | -0.356 | 0.131 | -0.181 | 0.054 | -0.126 | 0.045 | -0.153 | 0.042 |
| Cohort 1980 | -0.278 | 0.050 | -0.232 | 0.052 | -0.214 | 0.070 | -0.258 | 0.078 | -0.250 | 0.056 | -0.180 | 0.180 | -0.182 | 0.072 | -0.316 | 0.055 | -0.075 | 0.051 |
| Age 20 | -0.043 | 0.025 | -0.057 | 0.025 | -0.085 | 0.032 | -0.092 | 0.038 | -0.136 | 0.027 | -0.096 | 0.067 | -0.093 | 0.034 | -0.106 | 0.027 | -0.164 | 0.026 |
| Age 25 | 0.001 | 0.024 | -0.021 | 0.024 | -0.009 | 0.030 | 0.002 | 0.035 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.060 | -0.044 | 0.032 | -0.075 | 0.027 | -0.007 | 0.026 |
| Age 30 | -0.024 | 0.025 | 0.005 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.030 | -0.031 | 0.036 | -0.027 | 0.029 | -0.069 | 0.069 | 0.035 | 0.033 | 0.063 | 0.028 | 0.102 | 0.026 |
| Age 35 | 0.050 | 0.027 | -0.005 | 0.027 | 0.097 | 0.032 | 0.012 | 0.038 | 0.056 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.078 | 0.008 | 0.035 | 0.014 | 0.032 | 0.025 | 0.028 |
| Age 40 | 0.018 | 0.031 | 0.012 | 0.029 | -0.013 | 0.034 | 0.026 | 0.039 | 0.008 | 0.030 | 0.159 | 0.093 | 0.130 | 0.039 | 0.150 | 0.037 | 0.069 | 0.031 |
| Age 45 | 0.018 | 0.032 | 0.098 | 0.029 | 0.019 | 0.037 | 0.110 | 0.042 | 0.087 | 0.031 | 0.149 | 0.098 | 0.078 | 0.039 | 0.077 | 0.036 | 0.046 | 0.032 |
| Age 50 | 0.037 | 0.032 | 0.084 | 0.030 | 0.029 | 0.039 | 0.115 | 0.040 | 0.107 | 0.031 | -0.078 | 0.103 | 0.035 | 0.039 | 0.025 | 0.038 | -0.002 | 0.034 |
| Age 55 | -0.030 | 0.032 | 0.015 | 0.029 | -0.027 | 0.037 | 0.005 | 0.040 | 0.092 | 0.030 | -0.068 | 0.097 | -0.088 | 0.038 | -0.049 | 0.038 | 0.080 | 0.033 |
| Age 60 | 0.034 | 0.032 | -0.060 | 0.029 | 0.026 | 0.036 | 0.035 | 0.037 | -0.039 | 0.030 | -0.065 | 0.093 | 0.010 | 0.035 | -0.012 | 0.036 | -0.020 | 0.031 |
| Age 65 | -0.061 | 0.030 | -0.072 | 0.030 | -0.064 | 0.038 | -0.182 | 0.036 | -0.176 | 0.030 | 0.011 | 0.094 | -0.070 | 0.037 | -0.088 | 0.033 | -0.130 | 0.031 |
| Period 1975 | 0.187 | 0.021 | -0.061 | 0.020 | 0.081 | 0.025 | -0.126 | 0.027 | 0.205 | 0.021 | 0.063 | 0.043 | 0.028 | 0.024 | -0.063 | 0.021 | -0.071 | 0.023 |
| Period 1980 | -0.103 | 0.023 | -0.030 | 0.022 | 0.111 | 0.027 | 0.086 | 0.030 | -0.212 | 0.021 | 0.068 | 0.043 | -0.132 | 0.025 | 0.083 | 0.023 | -0.020 | 0.024 |
| Period 1985 | -0.080 | 0.022 | 0.030 | 0.022 | 0.026 | 0.027 | 0.077 | 0.033 | -0.357 | 0.023 | -0.189 | 0.042 | 0.003 | 0.027 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.064 | 0.024 |
| Period 1990 | -0.120 | 0.021 | 0.098 | 0.021 | -0.120 | 0.026 | 0.164 | 0.030 | 0.103 | 0.023 | 0.067 | 0.042 | 0.180 | 0.028 | 0.027 | 0.022 | 0.236 | 0.022 |
| Period 1995 | 0.098 | 0.024 | 0.148 | 0.022 | -0.292 | 0.026 | -0.189 | 0.029 | 0.405 | 0.026 | -0.106 | 0.040 | -0.016 | 0.029 | -0.125 | 0.023 | -0.135 | 0.023 |
| Period 2000 | -0.121 | 0.023 | -0.193 | 0.022 | -0.205 | 0.028 | -0.089 | 0.030 | 0.137 | 0.025 | 0.049 | 0.044 | -0.026 | 0.030 | 0.040 | 0.024 | -0.167 | 0.023 |
| Period 2005 | 0.139 | 0.023 | 0.009 | 0.021 | 0.398 | 0.029 | 0.079 | 0.031 | -0.281 | 0.023 | 0.048 | 0.056 | -0.036 | 0.031 | 0.015 | 0.025 | 0.094 | 0.023 |
| Resc Coh | 0.582 | 0.053 | 1.295 | 0.050 | 0.981 | 0.066 | 0.739 | 0.069 | 1.374 | 0.052 | -0.004 | 0.122 | 1.178 | 0.064 | -0.012 | 0.056 | -0.241 | 0.055 |
| Resc Age | 0.194 | 0.030 | 0.559 | 0.028 | 0.385 | 0.036 | 0.252 | 0.039 | 0.468 | 0.030 | -0.053 | 0.077 | 0.409 | 0.037 | 0.137 | 0.034 | 0.018 | 0.031 |
| Constant | 0.740 | 0.012 | 0.397 | 0.011 | 1.391 | 0.015 | 1.604 | 0.015 | 0.835 | 0.012 | 0.986 | 0.025 | 1.386 | 0.014 | 0.514 | 0.012 | 0.738 | 0.012 |

APCD with controls: education (reference = tertiary education), gender (reference = male), marital status (reference = widower, divorced, bachelor with no partner, etc)

| | fr:b | fr:se | be:b | be:se | nl:b | nl:se | de:b | de:se | it:b | it:se | lu:b | lu:se | dk:b | dk:se | ie:b | ie:se | uk:b | uk:se |
|--------------------------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Cohort 1915 | -0.398 | 0.065 | -0.373 | 0.063 | -0.278 | 0.071 | -0.347 | 0.068 | -0.166 | 0.061 | -0.427 | 0.124 | -0.167 | 0.059 | -0.308 | 0.063 | -0.333 | 0.059 |
| Cohort 1920 | -0.153 | 0.049 | -0.071 | 0.050 | -0.209 | 0.059 | 0.036 | 0.064 | -0.014 | 0.049 | -0.220 | 0.101 | -0.065 | 0.049 | -0.280 | 0.049 | -0.150 | 0.049 |
| Cohort 1925 | -0.036 | 0.041 | -0.087 | 0.041 | -0.157 | 0.050 | -0.215 | 0.049 | -0.043 | 0.039 | -0.011 | 0.078 | -0.034 | 0.046 | -0.139 | 0.042 | -0.063 | 0.043 |
| Cohort 1930 | -0.032 | 0.040 | -0.011 | 0.037 | -0.009 | 0.047 | -0.078 | 0.048 | -0.161 | 0.037 | -0.101 | 0.066 | -0.018 | 0.045 | 0.063 | 0.040 | 0.063 | 0.041 |
| Cohort 1935 | 0.119 | 0.037 | 0.064 | 0.035 | 0.109 | 0.045 | 0.194 | 0.044 | -0.026 | 0.035 | 0.195 | 0.065 | -0.011 | 0.042 | 0.116 | 0.038 | 0.082 | 0.039 |
| Cohort 1940 | 0.212 | 0.038 | 0.230 | 0.035 | 0.246 | 0.042 | 0.206 | 0.042 | 0.028 | 0.036 | 0.271 | 0.118 | 0.128 | 0.044 | 0.244 | 0.042 | 0.202 | 0.036 |
| Cohort 1945 | 0.309 | 0.035 | 0.250 | 0.033 | 0.325 | 0.039 | 0.176 | 0.045 | 0.171 | 0.035 | 0.305 | 0.114 | 0.204 | 0.042 | 0.290 | 0.041 | 0.311 | 0.035 |
| Cohort 1950 | 0.265 | 0.032 | 0.264 | 0.033 | 0.316 | 0.037 | 0.217 | 0.046 | 0.273 | 0.036 | 0.231 | 0.106 | 0.123 | 0.041 | 0.227 | 0.039 | 0.224 | 0.034 |
| Cohort 1955 | 0.231 | 0.030 | 0.203 | 0.029 | 0.272 | 0.037 | 0.167 | 0.045 | 0.240 | 0.035 | 0.231 | 0.100 | 0.118 | 0.040 | 0.263 | 0.035 | 0.115 | 0.032 |
| Cohort 1960 | 0.154 | 0.031 | 0.125 | 0.031 | 0.017 | 0.037 | 0.166 | 0.046 | 0.109 | 0.035 | 0.325 | 0.101 | 0.031 | 0.043 | 0.165 | 0.036 | 0.083 | 0.032 |
| Cohort 1965 | -0.028 | 0.032 | 0.005 | 0.032 | -0.067 | 0.038 | 0.041 | 0.048 | 0.044 | 0.037 | 0.110 | 0.097 | -0.044 | 0.044 | 0.080 | 0.037 | -0.064 | 0.033 |
| Cohort 1970 | -0.132 | 0.035 | -0.151 | 0.036 | -0.100 | 0.044 | -0.046 | 0.049 | 0.001 | 0.040 | -0.274 | 0.115 | -0.006 | 0.049 | -0.056 | 0.041 | -0.093 | 0.036 |
| Cohort 1975 | -0.224 | 0.042 | -0.207 | 0.043 | -0.207 | 0.055 | -0.234 | 0.061 | -0.196 | 0.046 | -0.352 | 0.141 | -0.154 | 0.055 | -0.232 | 0.048 | -0.213 | 0.045 |
| Cohort 1980 | -0.289 | 0.052 | -0.241 | 0.054 | -0.257 | 0.072 | -0.283 | 0.081 | -0.261 | 0.058 | -0.282 | 0.184 | -0.105 | 0.074 | -0.433 | 0.059 | -0.164 | 0.053 |
| Age 20 | -0.042 | 0.026 | -0.037 | 0.026 | -0.070 | 0.033 | -0.023 | 0.040 | -0.185 | 0.030 | -0.071 | 0.078 | -0.089 | 0.035 | -0.087 | 0.030 | -0.135 | 0.027 |
| Age 25 | 0.004 | 0.025 | -0.017 | 0.025 | 0.001 | 0.030 | 0.022 | 0.036 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.056 | 0.062 | -0.048 | 0.033 | -0.042 | 0.028 | 0.006 | 0.027 |
| Age 30 | -0.028 | 0.026 | 0.001 | 0.027 | 0.024 | 0.031 | -0.036 | 0.037 | -0.002 | 0.031 | -0.051 | 0.075 | 0.031 | 0.034 | 0.068 | 0.029 | 0.099 | 0.027 |
| Age 35 | 0.040 | 0.028 | -0.013 | 0.029 | 0.080 | 0.033 | -0.030 | 0.040 | 0.082 | 0.031 | -0.005 | 0.084 | 0.018 | 0.036 | -0.015 | 0.033 | 0.020 | 0.029 |
| Age 40 | 0.026 | 0.031 | 0.014 | 0.030 | -0.025 | 0.035 | -0.016 | 0.040 | 0.063 | 0.032 | 0.095 | 0.094 | 0.123 | 0.040 | 0.124 | 0.038 | 0.037 | 0.032 |
| Age 45 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.073 | 0.031 | 0.015 | 0.038 | 0.066 | 0.043 | 0.087 | 0.033 | 0.119 | 0.103 | 0.078 | 0.040 | 0.041 | 0.038 | 0.017 | 0.033 |
| Age 50 | 0.016 | 0.032 | 0.064 | 0.032 | 0.012 | 0.039 | 0.070 | 0.041 | 0.106 | 0.033 | -0.072 | 0.107 | 0.031 | 0.040 | 0.008 | 0.039 | -0.021 | 0.035 |
| Age 55 | -0.018 | 0.032 | 0.014 | 0.030 | -0.009 | 0.037 | 0.002 | 0.041 | 0.081 | 0.031 | -0.049 | 0.095 | -0.078 | 0.039 | -0.035 | 0.039 | 0.092 | 0.033 |
| Age 60 | 0.033 | 0.032 | -0.049 | 0.030 | 0.020 | 0.036 | 0.061 | 0.038 | -0.091 | 0.031 | -0.049 | 0.095 | -0.004 | 0.036 | -0.001 | 0.038 | -0.025 | 0.031 |
| Age 65 | -0.063 | 0.031 | -0.051 | 0.031 | -0.049 | 0.039 | -0.116 | 0.037 | -0.158 | 0.031 | 0.029 | 0.103 | -0.062 | 0.038 | -0.061 | 0.034 | -0.091 | 0.031 |
| Period 1975 | 0.163 | 0.021 | -0.060 | 0.020 | 0.116 | 0.025 | -0.137 | 0.028 | 0.209 | 0.022 | 0.085 | 0.045 | 0.012 | 0.024 | -0.071 | 0.022 | -0.063 | 0.024 |
| Period 1980 | -0.076 | 0.023 | -0.004 | 0.023 | 0.084 | 0.028 | 0.085 | 0.031 | -0.210 | 0.022 | 0.069 | 0.045 | -0.058 | 0.025 | 0.100 | 0.023 | -0.022 | 0.024 |
| Period 1985 | -0.086 | 0.023 | 0.006 | 0.023 | -0.034 | 0.027 | 0.073 | 0.034 | -0.351 | 0.024 | -0.213 | 0.044 | 0.025 | 0.028 | 0.015 | 0.023 | 0.041 | 0.024 |
| Period 1990 | -0.117 | 0.022 | 0.060 | 0.022 | -0.097 | 0.027 | 0.211 | 0.031 | 0.104 | 0.024 | 0.079 | 0.044 | 0.084 | 0.029 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.246 | 0.023 |
| Period 1995 | 0.107 | 0.024 | 0.179 | 0.023 | -0.271 | 0.027 | -0.210 | 0.030 | 0.390 | 0.027 | -0.125 | 0.042 | -0.061 | 0.029 | -0.120 | 0.024 | -0.147 | 0.024 |
| Period 2000 | -0.119 | 0.023 | -0.177 | 0.022 | -0.146 | 0.029 | -0.104 | 0.031 | 0.106 | 0.026 | 0.014 | 0.046 | -0.016 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.025 | -0.121 | 0.023 |
| Period 2005 | 0.128 | 0.023 | -0.003 | 0.022 | 0.348 | 0.030 | 0.083 | 0.032 | -0.249 | 0.024 | 0.092 | 0.058 | 0.013 | 0.031 | 0.020 | 0.026 | 0.066 | 0.024 |
| Resc Coh | 0.002 | 0.056 | 0.756 | 0.053 | 0.419 | 0.069 | 0.413 | 0.072 | 0.856 | 0.056 | -0.533 | 0.135 | 0.065 | 0.073 | -0.481 | 0.060 | -0.648 | 0.057 |
| Resc Age | 0.217 | 0.030 | 0.573 | 0.029 | 0.369 | 0.037 | 0.249 | 0.040 | 0.521 | 0.032 | -0.049 | 0.079 | -0.004 | 0.040 | 0.136 | 0.035 | 0.012 | 0.032 |
| Education (high=ref) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Middle | -0.731 | 0.028 | -0.763 | 0.026 | -0.752 | 0.033 | -0.665 | 0.049 | -0.494 | 0.035 | -0.794 | 0.118 | -0.566 | 0.036 | -0.836 | 0.045 | -0.745 | 0.042 |
| Low | -1.364 | 0.029 | -1.330 | 0.028 | -1.262 | 0.033 | -1.221 | 0.046 | -1.295 | 0.032 | -1.495 | 0.115 | -1.035 | 0.033 | -1.445 | 0.046 | -1.481 | 0.037 |
| Sex | -0.555 | 0.020 | -0.628 | 0.020 | -0.199 | 0.024 | -0.943 | 0.028 | -0.993 | 0.022 | -0.701 | 0.077 | -0.514 | 0.026 | -0.861 | 0.024 | -0.513 | 0.021 |
| Married/cohabiting (other=ref) | 0.028 | 0.023 | 0.119 | 0.023 | 0.125 | 0.029 | 0.307 | 0.029 | -0.010 | 0.026 | 0.262 | 0.091 | 0.012 | 0.030 | 0.142 | 0.028 | 0.066 | 0.024 |
| Constant | 1.832 | 0.030 | 1.403 | 0.028 | 2.128 | 0.034 | 2.857 | 0.049 | 2.250 | 0.035 | 2.144 | 0.116 | 2.141 | 0.035 | 1.913 | 0.046 | 2.124 | 0.040 |

Appendix 2 – A BIC comparison of models

| | (A) | (AP) | (APC) | Saturated |
|----|---------|----------------|----------------|-----------|
| fr | 74350.8 | 74172.9 | <u>74033.4</u> | 74417.1 |
| be | 77463.2 | 76528.7 | <u>76433.9</u> | 76826.3 |
| nl | 60008.3 | 59632.8 | <u>59590.8</u> | 59977.8 |
| de | 51134.6 | <u>50890.7</u> | 50903.3 | 51287.7 |
| it | 74586.2 | 72782.4 | <u>72674.7</u> | 73055.9 |
| lu | 28755.5 | 28777.0 | <u>28746.5</u> | 29101.4 |
| dk | 56965.7 | <u>56374.0</u> | 56378.4 | 56771.4 |
| ie | 73884.2 | 73886.6 | <u>73803.7</u> | 74191.0 |
| uk | 73053.7 | 72753.2 | <u>72723.9</u> | 73109.8 |

Here we compare the BIC of several models to detect the most parsimonious solutions. The lowest BIC, provided that the gap exceeds 4 units, denotes the best models. Age alone (A) and the full-interactions saturated models are never relevant. In most of the case, the introduction of cohort effects improves the model, exception with Germany and Denmark where age and period effects (AP) with no cohort bumps are sufficient.

Appendix 3 – Results provided by APC-IE and by HAPC (both are in Logit specification and with no control variables)

A3-a Detailed results provided by APC-IE

```
*****
fr

Intrinsic estimator of APC effects          No. of obs      =      60018
Optimization      : ML                     Residual df     =      59988
                                                    Scale parameter =      1
Deviance          = 73734.25257             (1/df) Deviance = 1.22915
Pearson          = 60026.05033             (1/df) Pearson  = 1.000634

Variance function: V(u) = u*(1-u/1)        [Binomial]
Link function     : g(u) = ln(u/(1-u))     [Logit]

Log likelihood    = -36867.12629           AIC              = 1.229535
                                                    BIC              = -586277.7
```

| poldisc | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| age_20 | .0836665 | .0259449 | 3.22 | 0.001 | .0328154 | .1345176 |
| age_25 | .0607936 | .0242976 | 2.50 | 0.012 | .0131713 | .108416 |
| age_30 | .0013341 | .0246278 | 0.05 | 0.957 | -.0469355 | .0496038 |
| age_35 | .0645524 | .0262045 | 2.46 | 0.014 | .0131925 | .1159122 |
| age_40 | .0035724 | .0285434 | 0.13 | 0.900 | -.0523716 | .0595165 |
| age_45 | -.0102651 | .0300183 | -0.34 | 0.732 | -.0690999 | .0485696 |
| age_50 | -.0230529 | .0298542 | -0.77 | 0.440 | -.0815661 | .0354604 |
| age_55 | -.0557764 | .0305415 | -1.83 | 0.068 | -.1156366 | .0040837 |
| age_60 | -.0236493 | .0317621 | -0.74 | 0.457 | -.0859019 | .0386034 |
| age_65 | -.1011753 | .031219 | -3.24 | 0.001 | -.1623635 | -.0399871 |
| period_1975 | .0215393 | .0230552 | 0.93 | 0.350 | -.023648 | .0667267 |
| period_1980 | -.2172181 | .0226112 | -9.61 | 0.000 | -.2615353 | -.172901 |
| period_1985 | -.1678575 | .0211101 | -7.95 | 0.000 | -.2092325 | -.1264825 |
| period_1990 | -.1189308 | .0202563 | -5.87 | 0.000 | -.1586323 | -.0792292 |
| period_1995 | .1680702 | .0220899 | 7.61 | 0.000 | .1247748 | .2113657 |
| period_2000 | -.0070358 | .0222891 | -0.32 | 0.752 | -.0507216 | .03665 |
| period_2005 | .3214327 | .0294653 | 10.91 | 0.000 | .2636818 | .3791836 |
| cohort_1910 | -.3070672 | .0739061 | -4.15 | 0.000 | -.4519204 | -.162214 |
| cohort_1915 | -.2573226 | .0619401 | -4.15 | 0.000 | -.378723 | -.1359222 |
| cohort_1920 | -.0472828 | .0465767 | -1.02 | 0.310 | -.1385715 | .0440059 |
| cohort_1925 | .0207306 | .038415 | 0.54 | 0.589 | -.0545615 | .0960227 |
| cohort_1930 | -.0700064 | .0376355 | -1.86 | 0.063 | -.1437706 | .0037579 |
| cohort_1935 | .0790986 | .035665 | 2.22 | 0.027 | .0091964 | .1490008 |
| cohort_1940 | .2176169 | .035359 | 6.15 | 0.000 | .1483145 | .2869193 |
| cohort_1945 | .3199873 | .0329769 | 9.70 | 0.000 | .2553537 | .3846209 |
| cohort_1950 | .3005908 | .0304001 | 9.89 | 0.000 | .2410077 | .3601739 |
| cohort_1955 | .2320409 | .0286108 | 8.11 | 0.000 | .1759648 | .2881171 |
| cohort_1960 | .1406133 | .0291167 | 4.83 | 0.000 | .0835456 | .197681 |
| cohort_1965 | -.0326316 | .0293364 | -1.11 | 0.266 | -.0901299 | .0248667 |
| cohort_1970 | -.0756562 | .0321505 | -2.35 | 0.019 | -.13867 | -.0126424 |
| cohort_1975 | -.1267623 | .0394097 | -3.22 | 0.001 | -.204004 | -.0495207 |
| cohort_1980 | -.2702205 | .0499981 | -5.40 | 0.000 | -.3682149 | -.1722261 |
| cohort_1985 | -.1237288 | .1047338 | -1.18 | 0.237 | -.3290033 | .0815457 |
| _cons | .7192615 | .0131617 | 54.65 | 0.000 | .6934651 | .7450579 |

```
*****
be

Intrinsic estimator of APC effects          No. of obs      =      57959
Optimization      : ML                     Residual df     =      57929
                                                    Scale parameter =      1
Deviance          = 76116.3476             (1/df) Deviance = 1.313959
Pearson          = 57959.20281             (1/df) Pearson  = 1.000521

Variance function: V(u) = u*(1-u/1)        [Binomial]
Link function     : g(u) = ln(u/(1-u))     [Logit]

Log likelihood    = -38058.1738           AIC              = 1.314314
                                                    BIC              = -559219.4
```

| poldisc | OIM | | | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|--------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | | | |
| age_20 | .0419832 | .0255799 | 1.64 | 0.101 | -.0081526 | .0921189 |
| age_25 | .0580859 | .0249167 | 2.33 | 0.020 | .00925 | .1069218 |
| age_30 | .0360728 | .0255271 | 1.41 | 0.158 | -.0139594 | .086105 |
| age_35 | .0062803 | .0260899 | 0.24 | 0.810 | -.0448549 | .0574155 |
| age_40 | .0149087 | .0265704 | 0.56 | 0.575 | -.0371682 | .0669857 |
| age_45 | .0774104 | .0274762 | 2.82 | 0.005 | .0235581 | .1312627 |
| age_50 | .0455509 | .0282575 | 1.61 | 0.107 | -.0098327 | .1009345 |
| age_55 | -.0622407 | .0285234 | -2.18 | 0.029 | -.1181455 | -.0063359 |
| age_60 | -.0928704 | .0290337 | -3.20 | 0.001 | -.1497753 | -.0359655 |
| age_65 | -.1251811 | .0306363 | -4.09 | 0.000 | -.1852272 | -.0651351 |
| period_1975 | -.4569215 | .0229593 | -19.90 | 0.000 | -.5019209 | -.4119221 |
| period_1980 | -.3263217 | .0218845 | -14.91 | 0.000 | -.3692146 | -.2834289 |
| period_1985 | -.1216135 | .0200645 | -6.06 | 0.000 | -.1609391 | -.0822879 |
| period_1990 | .104236 | .0196837 | 5.30 | 0.000 | .0656566 | .1428154 |
| period_1995 | .2850264 | .0214205 | 13.31 | 0.000 | .2430429 | .3270099 |
| period_2000 | .1044205 | .0217268 | 4.81 | 0.000 | .0618367 | .1470043 |
| period_2005 | .4111738 | .0277733 | 14.80 | 0.000 | .3567391 | .4656086 |
| cohort_1910 | -.3240639 | .0808322 | -4.01 | 0.000 | -.482492 | -.1656358 |
| cohort_1915 | -.3514488 | .0605278 | -5.81 | 0.000 | -.4700811 | -.2328164 |
| cohort_1920 | -.0599638 | .0456108 | -1.31 | 0.189 | -.1493594 | .0294318 |
| cohort_1925 | -.0466806 | .0387466 | -1.20 | 0.228 | -.1226225 | .0292614 |
| cohort_1930 | -.0213487 | .0356953 | -0.60 | 0.550 | -.0913102 | .0486129 |
| cohort_1935 | .0768616 | .0337699 | 2.28 | 0.023 | .0106738 | .1430494 |
| cohort_1940 | .2248252 | .0322932 | 6.96 | 0.000 | .1615317 | .2881186 |
| cohort_1945 | .2828252 | .0316414 | 8.94 | 0.000 | .2208091 | .3448412 |
| cohort_1950 | .2833726 | .0307169 | 9.23 | 0.000 | .2231686 | .3435765 |
| cohort_1955 | .2323197 | .0278016 | 8.36 | 0.000 | .1778295 | .2868099 |
| cohort_1960 | .1355158 | .0283264 | 4.78 | 0.000 | .0799971 | .1910345 |
| cohort_1965 | .0750402 | .0292803 | 2.56 | 0.010 | .017652 | .1324285 |
| cohort_1970 | -.0930637 | .0329467 | -2.82 | 0.005 | -.157638 | -.0284893 |
| cohort_1975 | -.0986988 | .0398249 | -2.48 | 0.013 | -.1767543 | -.0206434 |
| cohort_1980 | -.1964392 | .0516103 | -3.81 | 0.000 | -.2975935 | -.0952849 |
| cohort_1985 | -.1190529 | .1068518 | -1.11 | 0.265 | -.3284785 | .0903727 |
| _cons | .339625 | .0133079 | 25.52 | 0.000 | .3135419 | .365708 |

nl

Intrinsic estimator of APC effects
Optimization : ML
Deviance = 59273.95952
Pearson = 60300.69232
No. of obs = 60286
Residual df = 60256
Scale parameter = 1
(1/df) Deviance = .9837022
(1/df) Pearson = 1.000742
Variance function: V(u) = u*(1-u/l) [Binomial]
Link function : g(u) = ln(u/(1-u)) [Logit]
Log likelihood = -29636.97976
AIC = .9842079
BIC = -603955.1

| poldisc | OIM | | | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | | | |
| age_20 | -.0260843 | .0322063 | -0.81 | 0.418 | -.0892075 | .0370389 |
| age_25 | .0603317 | .0293075 | 2.06 | 0.040 | .0028902 | .1177733 |
| age_30 | .0575739 | .0285336 | 2.02 | 0.044 | .0016491 | .1134987 |
| age_35 | .1240404 | .029659 | 4.18 | 0.000 | .0659098 | .1821709 |
| age_40 | -.0099002 | .0311933 | -0.32 | 0.751 | -.071038 | .0512376 |
| age_45 | -.0101401 | .0337837 | -0.30 | 0.764 | -.0763549 | .0560747 |
| age_50 | -.0123911 | .0353675 | -0.35 | 0.726 | -.0817101 | .0569279 |
| age_55 | -.0747186 | .035058 | -2.13 | 0.033 | -.143431 | -.0060063 |
| age_60 | -.0383146 | .0352818 | -1.09 | 0.277 | -.1074656 | .0308364 |
| age_65 | -.0703971 | .0383311 | -1.84 | 0.066 | -.1455247 | .0047305 |
| period_1975 | -.2628813 | .0267339 | -9.83 | 0.000 | -.3152787 | -.2104838 |
| period_1980 | -.0913752 | .0262969 | -3.47 | 0.001 | -.1429162 | -.0398343 |
| period_1985 | -.0901374 | .0246239 | -3.66 | 0.000 | -.1383993 | -.0418755 |
| period_1990 | -.0908206 | .023684 | -3.83 | 0.000 | -.1372404 | -.0444008 |
| period_1995 | -.168557 | .0240877 | -7.00 | 0.000 | -.215768 | -.1213459 |
| period_2000 | -.0197463 | .0259291 | -0.76 | 0.446 | -.0705664 | .0310737 |
| period_2005 | .7235178 | .0390873 | 18.51 | 0.000 | .6469081 | .8001275 |
| cohort_1910 | -.1822511 | .0886362 | -2.06 | 0.040 | -.3559748 | -.0085274 |
| cohort_1915 | -.1313027 | .0665408 | -1.97 | 0.048 | -.2617203 | -.0008851 |
| cohort_1920 | -.033594 | .0539533 | -0.62 | 0.534 | -.1393405 | .0721526 |
| cohort_1925 | -.0746221 | .0466685 | -1.60 | 0.110 | -.1660906 | .0168464 |

Link function : $g(u) = \ln(u/(1-u))$ [Logit]
 AIC = 1.304584
 Log likelihood = -36738.38952 BIC = -542841.6

| poldisc | OIM | | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| | Coef. | Std. Err. | | | | |
| age_20 | -.172517 | .0250815 | -6.88 | 0.000 | -.2216759 | -.1233581 |
| age_25 | -.1532519 | .0255727 | -5.99 | 0.000 | -.2033734 | -.1031304 |
| age_30 | -.0010789 | .0246556 | -0.04 | 0.965 | -.0494029 | .0472451 |
| age_35 | -.0329901 | .0262696 | -1.26 | 0.209 | -.0844775 | .0184974 |
| age_40 | .1281739 | .0287695 | 4.46 | 0.000 | .0717866 | .1845611 |
| age_45 | .1027357 | .0284056 | 3.62 | 0.000 | .0470618 | .1584096 |
| age_50 | .0554154 | .0299208 | 1.85 | 0.064 | -.0032283 | .1140591 |
| age_55 | .020388 | .0299568 | 0.68 | 0.496 | -.0383262 | .0791022 |
| age_60 | .0366712 | .0308171 | 1.19 | 0.234 | -.0237293 | .0970716 |
| age_65 | .0164536 | .0311456 | 0.53 | 0.597 | -.0445906 | .0774978 |
| period_1975 | -.1101067 | .0235908 | -4.67 | 0.000 | -.1563438 | -.0638695 |
| period_1980 | .0583339 | .0227277 | 2.57 | 0.010 | .0137884 | .1028793 |
| period_1985 | -.0117262 | .0212633 | -0.55 | 0.581 | -.0534016 | .0299491 |
| period_1990 | .0094429 | .0203819 | 0.46 | 0.643 | -.0305049 | .0493908 |
| period_1995 | -.0886616 | .0212679 | -4.17 | 0.000 | -.1303459 | -.0469773 |
| period_2000 | .0649007 | .0221888 | 2.92 | 0.003 | .0214115 | .1083899 |
| period_2005 | .0778169 | .0269334 | 2.89 | 0.004 | .0250285 | .1306054 |
| cohort_1910 | -.2295234 | .0808286 | -2.84 | 0.005 | -.3879445 | -.0711024 |
| cohort_1915 | -.0755461 | .0592748 | -1.27 | 0.202 | -.1917225 | .0406303 |
| cohort_1920 | -.1292059 | .0453202 | -2.85 | 0.004 | -.2180319 | -.04038 |
| cohort_1925 | .0157687 | .0395588 | 0.40 | 0.690 | -.0617652 | .0933025 |
| cohort_1930 | .1471496 | .0373911 | 3.94 | 0.000 | .0738643 | .2204349 |
| cohort_1935 | .1663019 | .0358552 | 4.64 | 0.000 | .0960269 | .2365768 |
| cohort_1940 | .2476279 | .0349917 | 7.08 | 0.000 | .1790454 | .3162104 |
| cohort_1945 | .2978885 | .0325514 | 9.15 | 0.000 | .234089 | .361688 |
| cohort_1950 | .2371181 | .0306435 | 7.74 | 0.000 | .1770579 | .2971783 |
| cohort_1955 | .2280525 | .0279268 | 8.17 | 0.000 | .1733171 | .282788 |
| cohort_1960 | .1475508 | .0281285 | 5.25 | 0.000 | .09242 | .2026817 |
| cohort_1965 | .0422052 | .0292742 | 1.44 | 0.149 | -.0151712 | .0995817 |
| cohort_1970 | -.0572063 | .0314154 | -1.82 | 0.069 | -.1187793 | .0043667 |
| cohort_1975 | -.1604655 | .0369594 | -4.34 | 0.000 | -.2329046 | -.0880263 |
| cohort_1980 | -.3978962 | .0446434 | -8.91 | 0.000 | -.4853957 | -.3103966 |
| cohort_1985 | -.4798199 | .0901184 | -5.32 | 0.000 | -.6564486 | -.3031911 |
| _cons | .4488647 | .0126473 | 35.49 | 0.000 | .4240764 | .473653 |

uk

Intrinsic estimator of APC effects No. of obs = 58514
 Optimization : ML Residual df = 58484
 Scale parameter = 1
 Deviance = 72382.78864 (1/df) Deviance = 1.237651
 Pearson = 58515.52589 (1/df) Pearson = 1.000539

Variance function: $V(u) = u*(1-u/1)$ [Binomial]
 Link function : $g(u) = \ln(u/(1-u))$ [Logit]

AIC = 1.238042
 Log likelihood = -36191.39432 BIC = -569597.3

| poldisc | OIM | | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| | Coef. | Std. Err. | | | | |
| age_20 | -.1935516 | .0260555 | -7.43 | 0.000 | -.2446194 | -.1424838 |
| age_25 | -.0579975 | .0261108 | -2.22 | 0.026 | -.1091737 | -.0068212 |
| age_30 | .0321542 | .0252508 | 1.27 | 0.203 | -.0173365 | .0816448 |
| age_35 | -.0183448 | .0260974 | -0.70 | 0.482 | -.0694948 | .0328052 |
| age_40 | .0376631 | .0283835 | 1.33 | 0.185 | -.0179676 | .0932938 |
| age_45 | .0259213 | .0293677 | 0.88 | 0.377 | -.0316383 | .0834809 |
| age_50 | .0025123 | .0305088 | 0.08 | 0.934 | -.0572839 | .0623084 |
| age_55 | .1077777 | .030906 | 3.49 | 0.000 | .047203 | .1683524 |
| age_60 | .052809 | .0300444 | 1.76 | 0.079 | -.0060769 | .1116949 |
| age_65 | .0110563 | .0303558 | 0.36 | 0.716 | -.0484399 | .0705525 |
| period_1975 | .0134943 | .023763 | 0.57 | 0.570 | -.0330803 | .060069 |
| period_1980 | -.0002677 | .0225805 | -0.01 | 0.991 | -.0445246 | .0439893 |
| period_1985 | .0701091 | .0218553 | 3.21 | 0.001 | .0272735 | .1129448 |
| period_1990 | .2352022 | .0212458 | 11.07 | 0.000 | .1935613 | .2768432 |
| period_1995 | -.1614721 | .0209775 | -7.70 | 0.000 | -.2025871 | -.120357 |
| period_2000 | -.2037608 | .0218494 | -9.33 | 0.000 | -.2465848 | -.1609369 |
| period_2005 | .0466949 | .0289946 | 1.61 | 0.107 | -.0101336 | .1035233 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------|-----------|----------|-------|-------|-----------|-----------|
| cohort_1910 | -.1403988 | .0791642 | -1.77 | 0.076 | -.2955578 | .0147601 |
| cohort_1915 | -.1237357 | .0557169 | -2.22 | 0.026 | -.2329388 | -.0145325 |
| cohort_1920 | -.0171111 | .0456422 | -0.37 | 0.708 | -.1065681 | .072346 |
| cohort_1925 | .0081396 | .0405145 | 0.20 | 0.841 | -.0712673 | .0875465 |
| cohort_1930 | .1297797 | .0378833 | 3.43 | 0.001 | .0555298 | .2040297 |
| cohort_1935 | .1135257 | .0356538 | 3.18 | 0.001 | .0436455 | .1834058 |
| cohort_1940 | .2107867 | .03335 | 6.32 | 0.000 | .145422 | .2761515 |
| cohort_1945 | .3088266 | .0324866 | 9.51 | 0.000 | .245154 | .3724992 |
| cohort_1950 | .258257 | .0313905 | 8.23 | 0.000 | .1967327 | .3197812 |
| cohort_1955 | .1231923 | .0291711 | 4.22 | 0.000 | .066018 | .1803665 |
| cohort_1960 | .0449667 | .0291712 | 1.54 | 0.123 | -.0122077 | .1021411 |
| cohort_1965 | -.0965005 | .0298261 | -3.24 | 0.001 | -.1549586 | -.0380424 |
| cohort_1970 | -.1715852 | .0322076 | -5.33 | 0.000 | -.234711 | -.1084595 |
| cohort_1975 | -.1984526 | .0401643 | -4.94 | 0.000 | -.2771732 | -.1197319 |
| cohort_1980 | -.1666781 | .0499267 | -3.34 | 0.001 | -.2645326 | -.0688235 |
| cohort_1985 | -.2830124 | .1010498 | -2.80 | 0.005 | -.4810663 | -.0849585 |
| _cons | .6944288 | .0131172 | 52.94 | 0.000 | .6687196 | .7201381 |

A3-b Synthetic results provided by APC-IE

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|-------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | poldisc | poldisc | poldisc | poldisc | poldisc | poldisc | poldisc | poldisc | poldisc |
| age_20 | 0.0837 | 0.0420 | -0.0261 | 0.0298 | 0.0649 | -0.0806 | 0.0986 | -0.173 | -0.194 |
| age_25 | 0.0608 | 0.0581 | 0.0603 | 0.120 | 0.144 | 0.0136 | 0.121 | -0.153 | -0.0580 |
| age_30 | 0.00133 | 0.0361 | 0.0576 | 0.0120 | 0.0416 | -0.0751 | 0.0863 | -0.00108 | 0.0322 |
| age_35 | 0.0646 | 0.00628 | 0.124 | 0.0353 | 0.0788 | -0.00348 | 0.0424 | -0.0330 | -0.0183 |
| age_40 | 0.00357 | 0.0149 | -0.00990 | 0.0242 | -0.00373 | -0.0281 | 0.127 | 0.128 | 0.0377 |
| age_45 | -0.0103 | 0.0774 | -0.0101 | 0.0714 | 0.0424 | 0.0372 | 0.0377 | 0.103 | 0.0259 |
| age_50 | -0.0231 | 0.0456 | -0.0124 | 0.0242 | 0.0356 | 0.0664 | -0.0475 | 0.0554 | 0.00251 |
| age_55 | -0.0558 | -0.0622 | -0.0747 | -0.0360 | 0.0110 | 0.0264 | -0.147 | 0.0204 | 0.108 |
| age_60 | -0.0236 | -0.0929 | -0.0383 | -0.0522 | -0.142 | -0.0295 | -0.117 | 0.0367 | 0.0528 |
| age_65 | -0.101 | -0.125 | -0.0704 | -0.228 | -0.272 | 0.0730 | -0.201 | 0.0165 | 0.0111 |
| period_1975 | 0.0215 | -0.457 | -0.263 | -0.374 | -0.225 | 0.0530 | -0.362 | -0.110 | 0.0135 |
| period_1980 | -0.217 | -0.326 | -0.0914 | -0.0832 | -0.434 | 0.00963 | -0.377 | 0.0583 | -0.000268 |
| period_1985 | -0.168 | -0.122 | -0.0901 | 0.00324 | -0.486 | -0.165 | -0.127 | -0.0117 | 0.0701 |
| period_1990 | -0.119 | 0.104 | -0.0908 | 0.186 | 0.0776 | 0.116 | 0.186 | 0.00944 | 0.235 |
| period_1995 | 0.168 | 0.285 | -0.169 | -0.0942 | 0.556 | -0.100 | 0.131 | -0.0887 | -0.161 |
| period_2000 | -0.00704 | 0.104 | -0.0197 | 0.0632 | 0.417 | 0.00537 | 0.233 | 0.0649 | -0.204 |
| period_2005 | 0.321 | 0.411 | 0.724 | 0.299 | 0.0950 | 0.0816 | 0.315 | 0.0778 | 0.0467 |
| cohort_1910 | -0.307 | -0.324 | -0.182 | -0.244 | -0.239 | 0.182 | -0.432 | -0.230 | -0.140 |
| cohort_1915 | -0.257 | -0.351 | -0.131 | -0.204 | -0.130 | -0.427 | -0.187 | -0.0755 | -0.124 |
| cohort_1920 | -0.0473 | -0.0600 | -0.0336 | 0.0350 | -0.0258 | -0.200 | -0.0876 | -0.129 | -0.0171 |
| cohort_1925 | 0.0207 | -0.0467 | -0.0746 | -0.160 | -0.0627 | -0.0894 | -0.0374 | 0.0158 | 0.00814 |
| cohort_1930 | -0.0700 | -0.0213 | 0.0378 | -0.0434 | -0.203 | -0.138 | 0.0216 | 0.147 | 0.130 |
| cohort_1935 | 0.0791 | 0.0769 | 0.110 | 0.165 | -0.112 | 0.181 | 0.000844 | 0.166 | 0.114 |
| cohort_1940 | 0.218 | 0.225 | 0.244 | 0.194 | -0.00657 | 0.190 | 0.186 | 0.248 | 0.211 |
| cohort_1945 | 0.320 | 0.283 | 0.328 | 0.250 | 0.175 | 0.363 | 0.317 | 0.298 | 0.309 |
| cohort_1950 | 0.301 | 0.283 | 0.310 | 0.275 | 0.331 | 0.342 | 0.250 | 0.237 | 0.258 |
| cohort_1955 | 0.232 | 0.232 | 0.303 | 0.219 | 0.334 | 0.353 | 0.265 | 0.228 | 0.123 |
| cohort_1960 | 0.141 | 0.136 | 0.0881 | 0.230 | 0.196 | 0.264 | 0.150 | 0.148 | 0.0450 |
| cohort_1965 | -0.0326 | 0.0750 | -0.00443 | 0.0851 | 0.0776 | 0.00401 | 0.0555 | 0.0422 | -0.0965 |
| cohort_1970 | -0.0757 | -0.0931 | -0.0338 | -0.0213 | 0.0683 | -0.143 | 0.0587 | -0.0572 | -0.172 |
| cohort_1975 | -0.127 | -0.0987 | -0.00760 | -0.201 | -0.0241 | -0.247 | -0.116 | -0.160 | -0.198 |
| cohort_1980 | -0.270 | -0.196 | -0.124 | -0.151 | -0.115 | -0.393 | -0.108 | -0.398 | -0.167 |
| cohort_1985 | -0.124 | -0.119 | -0.829 | -0.427 | -0.264 | -0.243 | -0.336 | -0.480 | -0.283 |
| _cons | 0.719 | 0.340 | 1.306 | 1.571 | 0.773 | 0.991 | 1.324 | 0.449 | 0.694 |

A3-c Detailed results provided by HAPC

We thank Fred Pampel for the STATA syntax developed in his paper (Pampel and Hunter 2012) that we could adapt our case

```
fr
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs      =      58907
Group variable: _all                  Number of groups   =          1
                                      Obs per group: min =      58907
                                      avg =      58907.0
                                      max =      58907
Integration points =      1            Wald chi2(2)       =          8.11
Log likelihood = -36187.508           Prob > chi2        =          0.0174
```

| poldisc | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|----------|
| zag | .1020267 | .0480574 | 2.12 | 0.034 | .0078359 | .1962175 |
| zag2 | -.0187121 | .0108907 | -1.72 | 0.086 | -.0400574 | .0026332 |
| _cons | .7548571 | .0844765 | 8.94 | 0.000 | .5892862 | .920428 |

| Random-effects Parameters | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|-----------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------|
| _all: Identity sd(R.ye5) | .1322385 | .0379975 | .0752963 | .2322429 |
| _all: Identity sd(R.co5) | .2507522 | .0725175 | .1422582 | .4419897 |

LR test vs. logistic regression: chi2(2) = 384.39 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```
be
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs      =      57004
Group variable: _all                  Number of groups   =          1
                                      Obs per group: min =      57004
                                      avg =      57004.0
                                      max =      57004
Integration points =      1            Wald chi2(2)       =          12.84
Log likelihood = -37487.341           Prob > chi2        =          0.0016
```

| poldisc | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| zag | .0652236 | .0530665 | 1.23 | 0.219 | -.0387848 | .1692321 |
| zag2 | -.0338069 | .0104224 | -3.24 | 0.001 | -.0542344 | -.0133795 |
| _cons | .3748489 | .1087506 | 3.45 | 0.001 | .1617015 | .5879962 |

| Random-effects Parameters | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|-----------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------|
| _all: Identity sd(R.ye5) | .2299908 | .0703341 | .1262997 | .4188115 |
| _all: Identity sd(R.co5) | .2400692 | .0715703 | .1338361 | .4306255 |

LR test vs. logistic regression: chi2(2) = 1051.31 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```
nl
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs      =      59568
Group variable: _all                  Number of groups   =          1
                                      Obs per group: min =      59568
                                      avg =      59568.0
                                      max =      59568
Integration points =      1            Wald chi2(2)       =          13.60
Log likelihood = -29258.435           Prob > chi2        =          0.0011
```

| poldisc | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| zag | .0680897 | .0551567 | 1.23 | 0.217 | -.0400155 | .1761948 |
| zag2 | -.0428469 | .0132178 | -3.24 | 0.001 | -.0687533 | -.0169405 |
| _cons | 1.377948 | .1115518 | 12.35 | 0.000 | 1.159311 | 1.596586 |

| Random-effects Parameters | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|---------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|--|
|---------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|--|

```

-----+-----
_all: Identity          |          |
      sd(R.ye5)         |          | .255744 .0732369 .1458977 .4482934
-----+-----
_all: Identity          |          |
      sd(R.co5)         |          | .2000396 .0683504 .1023938 .3908033
-----+-----
LR test vs. logistic regression:  chi2(2) = 505.95  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```

```

*****
de
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs      =      57639
Group variable: _all                   Number of groups   =         1
                                       Obs per group: min =      57639
                                       avg =      57639.0
                                       max =      57639
Integration points = 1                  Wald chi2(2)       =       21.32
Log likelihood = -24746.02              Prob > chi2        =       0.0000

```

| poldisc | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| zag | -.0268978 | .0315518 | -0.85 | 0.394 | -.0887381 .0349425 |
| zag2 | -.0626181 | .0139607 | -4.49 | 0.000 | -.0899805 -.0352557 |
| _cons | 1.637388 | .0854762 | 19.16 | 0.000 | 1.469857 1.804918 |

| Random-effects Parameters | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|
| _all: Identity sd(R.ye5) | .1924117 | .0553456 | .109494 .3381213 |
| _all: Identity sd(R.co5) | .1590284 | .0364438 | .1014867 .2491958 |

```

LR test vs. logistic regression:  chi2(2) = 325.22  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```

```

*****
it
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs      =      59797
Group variable: _all                   Number of groups   =         1
                                       Obs per group: min =      59797
                                       avg =      59797.0
                                       max =      59797
Integration points = 1                  Wald chi2(2)       =       36.60
Log likelihood = -35622.133            Prob > chi2        =       0.0000

```

| poldisc | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| zag | -.0576191 | .0354764 | -1.62 | 0.104 | -.1271515 .0119134 |
| zag2 | -.0631865 | .0108143 | -5.84 | 0.000 | -.0843822 -.0419908 |
| _cons | .8264229 | .1453749 | 5.68 | 0.000 | .5414935 1.111352 |

| Random-effects Parameters | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|
| _all: Identity sd(R.ye5) | .3640971 | .0991105 | .2135563 .6207574 |
| _all: Identity sd(R.co5) | .1700707 | .0426863 | .1039884 .2781468 |

```

LR test vs. logistic regression:  chi2(2) = 2004.30  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```

```

*****
lu
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs      =      25085
Group variable: _all                   Number of groups   =         1
                                       Obs per group: min =      25085
                                       avg =      25085.0
                                       max =      25085
Integration points = 1                  Wald chi2(2)       =         4.29
Log likelihood = -14065.493            Prob > chi2        =       0.1173

```

| poldisc | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| zag | .0446098 | .0353273 | 1.26 | 0.207 | -.0246304 .11385 |
| zag2 | -.0317011 | .0181769 | -1.74 | 0.081 | -.0673271 .0039249 |
| _cons | 1.006747 | .072617 | 13.86 | 0.000 | .8644204 1.149074 |

```

Random-effects Parameters | Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
_all: Identity
      sd(R.ye5) | .0859752 .0289708 .0444168 .1664177
-----+-----
_all: Identity
      sd(R.co5) | .2331601 .0493516 .1539875 .3530392
-----+-----
LR test vs. logistic regression:   chi2(2) = 149.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```

```

dk
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs   = 57222
Group variable: _all                   Number of groups = 1
                                         Obs per group: min = 57222
                                         avg = 57222.0
                                         max = 57222
Integration points = 1                  Wald chi2(2)    = 12.55
Log likelihood = -27503.131              Prob > chi2     = 0.0019

```

```

-----+-----
poldisc | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
      zag | -.0523745 .036253 -1.44 0.149 -.1234291 .01868
      zag2 | -.0434017 .0130723 -3.32 0.001 -.069023 -.0177805
      _cons | 1.398368 .1027811 13.61 0.000 1.196921 1.599815
-----+-----

```

```

Random-effects Parameters | Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
_all: Identity
      sd(R.ye5) | .2449452 .0700763 .1398135 .4291299
-----+-----
_all: Identity
      sd(R.co5) | .158604 .0421268 .0942381 .2669329
-----+-----
LR test vs. logistic regression:   chi2(2) = 644.76 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```

```

ie
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs   = 55371
Group variable: _all                   Number of groups = 1
                                         Obs per group: min = 55371
                                         avg = 55371.0
                                         max = 55371
Integration points = 1                  Wald chi2(2)    = 90.01
Log likelihood = -36090.663              Prob > chi2     = 0.0000

```

```

-----+-----
poldisc | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
      zag | .1464881 .0246458 5.94 0.000 .0981833 .194793
      zag2 | -.0792726 .0106489 -7.44 0.000 -.100144 -.0584012
      _cons | .4880586 .0534476 9.13 0.000 .3833032 .5928141
-----+-----

```

```

Random-effects Parameters | Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
_all: Identity
      sd(R.ye5) | .0604507 .0200286 .0315777 .1157237
-----+-----
_all: Identity
      sd(R.co5) | .1764053 .0367619 .1172536 .2653978
-----+-----
LR test vs. logistic regression:   chi2(2) = 199.45 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```

```

uk
Mixed-effects logistic regression      Number of obs   = 57498
Group variable: _all                   Number of groups = 1
                                         Obs per group: min = 57498
                                         avg = 57498.0
                                         max = 57498
Integration points = 1                  Wald chi2(2)    = 42.36
Log likelihood = -35569.607              Prob > chi2     = 0.0000

```

```

-----+-----
poldisc | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
      zag | .1100132 .0246818 4.46 0.000 .0616378 .1583886
      zag2 | -.0550215 .0107524 -5.12 0.000 -.0760958 -.0339472
      _cons | .7222993 .0687724 10.50 0.000 .587508 .8570907
-----+-----

```

| Random-effects Parameters | | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------------|----------|
| _all: Identity | sd(R.ye5) | .1505477 | .0420612 | .0870681 | .2603091 |
| _all: Identity | sd(R.co5) | .1386182 | .0293161 | .0915802 | .2098163 |
| LR test vs. logistic regression: | | chi2(2) = | 465.45 | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 | |

A3-c Synthetic results provided by HAPC

| co5 | cohbefr | cohbebe | cohbenl | cohbede | cohbeit | cohbelu | cohbedk | cohbeie | cohbeuk |
|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1916 | -.5437314 | -.5561736 | -.3542354 | -.2473655 | -.1927351 | -.3492748 | -.2969463 | -.2856742 | -.2146513 |
| 1921 | -.3335615 | -.3457143 | -.2856336 | -.0925064 | -.0735711 | -.1466027 | -.1679851 | -.259824 | -.083012 |
| 1926 | -.2342802 | -.1996919 | -.2562954 | -.2096421 | -.1571657 | -.1488625 | -.1385737 | -.1161091 | -.0714455 |
| 1931 | -.2905835 | -.1822897 | -.1654716 | -.0524953 | -.2392847 | -.1304453 | -.0724729 | .0095889 | .0266801 |
| 1936 | -.0766184 | -.019916 | -.0336737 | .0689194 | -.1324391 | .1564955 | -.0798193 | .0391426 | .0606641 |
| 1941 | .1110336 | .1462609 | .0870777 | .1268795 | -.0472685 | .1827483 | .1249022 | .1785045 | .1365631 |
| 1946 | .2094941 | .2412185 | .2334116 | .1496783 | .1285602 | .2882922 | .2190644 | .2288069 | .2431339 |
| 1951 | .279948 | .2276129 | .2584307 | .2323294 | .2858087 | .3196986 | .2071811 | .1793634 | .2053553 |
| 1956 | .2474161 | .2485648 | .2223348 | .1396665 | .2853175 | .3040007 | .1696344 | .2049869 | .1005695 |
| 1961 | .2055959 | .1496314 | .1101792 | .1867206 | .1245687 | .1987061 | .1048791 | .1241749 | .0121101 |
| 1966 | .0932328 | .1580256 | .0226924 | .0274616 | .0413082 | -.0765561 | .0559671 | .0508352 | -.1059229 |
| 1971 | .1145528 | .0470242 | .0797156 | -.1000102 | .1014801 | -.1285644 | .0077885 | -.0250697 | -.1194688 |
| 1976 | .0796793 | .0601424 | .0559735 | -.1083068 | -.0619947 | -.2710211 | -.0671089 | -.0786897 | -.1153156 |
| 1981 | .1349462 | .024673 | .0229843 | -.1246336 | -.0630583 | -.209196 | -.0682859 | -.2519874 | -.0764353 |
| | cohbsEFR | cohbsEBe | cohbsEnL | cohbsEdE | cohbsEIt | cohbsElU | cohbsEdK | cohbsEIE | cohbsEUk |
| stderr | .04752 | .0573279 | .0552483 | .0502657 | .051267 | .0517762 | .0496685 | .032534 | .0404745 |

Appendix 4 – Results of the OLS regression of the detrended cohort coefficients of political participation (`poldidce`) on the country-specific detrended size of birth cohorts (`demodce`) and the country-specific detrended real economic growth, in log-gdp (`lgdpdce`)

A first correlation matrix shows that no variable is cohort-trended, and correlations are relatively strong (but not too strongly see below)

```
. pwcorr poldidce demodce lgdpdce c , star(.05)
```

| | poldidce | demodce | lgdpdce | coh |
|----------|----------|---------|---------|--------|
| poldidce | 1.0000 | | | |
| demodce | 0.4763* | 1.0000 | | |
| lgdpdce | 0.4206* | 0.4014* | 1.0000 | |
| coh | -0.0000 | 0.0000 | -0.0000 | 1.0000 |

The OLS regression shows the role of both cohort size and economic growth in cohort bumps

```
. reg poldidce demodce lgdpdce, robust
```

Linear regression

```
Number of obs = 108
F( 2, 105) = 44.79
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.2896
Root MSE = .14101
```

| | Coef. | Robust Std. Err. | t | P> t | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------|-----------|------------------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| demodce | .5807928 | .1273595 | 4.56 | 0.000 | .3282626 .8333231 |
| lgdpdce | .5047088 | .18752 | 2.69 | 0.008 | .1328913 .8765263 |
| _cons | -5.79e-11 | .0135691 | -0.00 | 1.000 | -.0269051 .0269051 |

The variance inflation factor shows that, even if the explanatory variables are correlated, we have no problem of excessive collinearity

```
. vif
```

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|----------|------|----------|
| demodce | 1.19 | 0.838884 |
| lgdpdce | 1.19 | 0.838884 |
| Mean VIF | 1.19 | |